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SUMMARY
This report explores the implications of Brexit for UK participation in the EU’s 
flagship programme for research and innovation, Horizon 2020, and the EU’s 
international mobility programme, Erasmus+, which provides opportunities for 
young people and teaching staff to study, work, and train abroad.
The UK is a respected and important partner in both the Erasmus+ and 
Horizon 2020 programmes. It is a popular destination for mobility placements 
and a world leader in research, with an exceptionally strong science base. In 
return, the UK receives substantial amounts of funding, access to professional 
networks, and opportunities to connect and collaborate with European partners 
built over decades of cooperation under the shared framework of the Erasmus 
and Horizon programmes.
Under Erasmus+, €1 billion is expected to be allocated to the UK between 2014 
and 2020 to support university student exchanges, work and vocational training 
placements, youth projects, and opportunities for staff working at all levels of 
education to teach or train abroad. Extra funding is available for people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, and those with disabilities or additional needs, 
to ensure these mobility opportunities are inclusive and accessible to all. The 
programme also funds cooperation projects between universities, schools and 
colleges across Europe, and brings together young people and decision-makers 
to help improve youth policy.
The UK is the second largest recipient of Horizon 2020 funding and has 
received 15.2% of grants distributed through the programme so far, totalling 
€5.7 billion. As well as funding UK research projects, Horizon 2020 supports 
scientific partnerships with countries across Europe and beyond, provides 
access to large-scale international research facilities and joint infrastructure, 
and offers fellowships for talented researchers to spend time working abroad.
As an EU Member State, the UK has access now to all Erasmus+ and Horizon 
2020 funding programmes. The Withdrawal Agreement would maintain this 
access, and UK participation in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 would continue 
largely unchanged until both programmes draw to a close at the end of 2020, 
which coincides with the expected end of the transition period.
In preparation for a ‘no deal’ scenario, the Government has committed to 
underwrite funding from EU programmes until the end of 2020. However, the 
Government still needs to agree terms with the EU for UK organisations to 
continue to participate in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 projects as third country 
entities. We were concerned to learn that the European Commission has thus 
far been unwilling to engage in discussions on ‘no deal’ contingency plans, and 
urge both parties to work together to avoid disruption to research projects and 
UK and EU nationals on Erasmus+ placements. There is also an urgent need 
for greater clarity on how the Government intends the underwrite guarantee 
to operate in practice, including who will disburse the funding and what terms 
and conditions will apply to beneficiaries.
Of particular concern to the UK’s research community in a ‘no deal’ scenario is 
the loss of access to key sources of Horizon 2020 funding, including the European 
Research Council and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, which are not open 
to third country participation and so are not covered by the Government’s 
4 BRExIT: THE ERASMUS AND HORIzON PROGRAMMES
underwrite guarantee. The Government’s own statistics show that grants from 
these programmes account for about 44% of total UK receipts from Horizon 
2020. We note that the Government is keenly aware of this issue and emphasise 
the importance of confirming replacements for these funding streams as soon 
as possible. The UK and the EU will also need to establish arrangements to 
maintain the free flow of data and regulatory alignment for clinical trials and 
chemical registration, which are essential to facilitating international research 
collaboration.
Whether the UK leaves the EU under the Withdrawal Agreement or in a ‘no 
deal’ scenario, it could still seek to participate in the successor programmes 
to Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020—‘Erasmus’ and ‘Horizon Europe’, which 
will run from 2021 to 2027—as a third country. We strongly believe—and it 
was the unanimous view of our witnesses—that it is in the UK and the EU’s 
mutual interest to preserve current close levels of cooperation on research and 
innovation and educational mobility, and that the UK should participate fully in 
the Erasmus and Horizon Europe programmes as an associated third country. 
We are encouraged by positive indications in the Political Declaration on the 
future UK-EU relationship that this will be possible.
Associate membership would not give the UK voting rights in the committees 
which oversee the strategic planning of the programmes, and so the UK would 
have less influence over the priorities and future development of Erasmus and 
Horizon Europe than would EU Member States. The strength of the UK’s 
science base should, however, help to ensure the UK remains an influential 
player in European research and innovation.
The financial contributions required to secure association to the successor 
programmes are likely to be higher than for Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020, as 
both programmes are set to have substantially larger budgets. The proposal 
to establish Horizon Europe also sets out a financial rebalancing mechanism, 
which would mean the UK could not be a net beneficiary of EU research 
and innovation funding, as it is today. Nonetheless, although the costs of 
participation will be greater, so too will be the opportunities for funding and 
international collaboration offered under the larger 2021–2027 Erasmus and 
Horizon Europe programmes. We consider the cost of securing association to 
them a worthwhile investment to preserve access to all programme funding 
streams and international collaboration opportunities that raise the standard of 
education and support excellent science in the UK.
If the Government is not willing or able to secure association to these 
programmes, alternative UK funding schemes would be needed. However, 
it would be a formidable challenge to try to replicate at a national level the 
substantial benefits of the EU’s programmes for research and innovation and 
international mobility.
As for Erasmus, the Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research 
and Innovation acknowledged that the value of the programme, and the 
partnerships built through it over the past 30 years, could not simply be equated 
with monetary spend. We were struck by the stark warning that mobility 
opportunities for people in vocational education and training would “stop in 
their tracks” without Erasmus funding, and we are particularly concerned that 
losing access to the programme would disproportionately affect people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and those with medical needs or disabilities. The 
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time and resources required to establish and maintain exchange partnerships 
without the support of Erasmus could also be a prohibitive burden for many 
smaller organisations.
The EU’s research and innovation programmes also provide clear benefits over 
and above grant funding. They support cross-border research partnerships, 
provide access to large-scale research facilities, joint infrastructure and 
equipment, and facilitate the mobility of the most talented researchers across 
Europe. We note that the Government has committed to increase spending on 
research to 2.4% of GDP by 2027, but it is clear that it would take many years 
for any UK alternative to emulate the strength and productivity of the research 
collaborations built through the EU’s research programmes, and the prestigious 
reputation of funding instruments like the excellence-based European Research 
Council grants.
We urge the Government to confirm whether it will seek full association to the 
2021–2027 Erasmus and Horizon Europe programmes as soon as possible, to 
maximise certainty and stability for UK students and researchers, and to enable 
them to plan for any changes.

Brexit: the Erasmus and Horizon 
programmes
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Overview
1. ‘Horizon 2020’ and ‘Erasmus+’ are the 2014–2020 EU funding programmes 
for research and innovation and for education, training, youth and sport, 
including educational exchanges for young people. The UK is currently 
a significant player in both programmes. Over 53% of university students 
undertaking a period of study abroad do so through Erasmus+, and the 
UK has the highest share (12.8%) of participants in signed Horizon 2020 
grant agreements. The UK has received €5.7 billion (15.2%) of Horizon 
2020 funding distributed so far, making it the second largest recipient of 
programme funding after Germany. Under Erasmus+, the UK is expected 
to be allocated €1 billion over the 2014–2020 period and €677 million has 
been distributed to UK projects to date.1
2. Consequently, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU—and the related potential 
loss of access to Erasmus or Horizon in March 2019, or at the end of any 
transition period—could have a significant impact on ‘mobility opportunities’ 
for people in the UK to study, train, teach, and gain experience abroad, and 
on the funding available for UK research projects, and how UK organisations 
participate in international research collaboration.
This inquiry
3. This short inquiry focused on the short and longer-term implications of Brexit 
for UK participation in the Erasmus+ and Horizon 20202 programmes. The 
report begins with an overview of both programmes, and plans for their 
successors in the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework period (the 
‘Erasmus’3 and ‘Horizon Europe’ programmes). Chapter 3 explores the 
implications of the UK leaving the EU under the terms of the November 
2018 Withdrawal Agreement, compared to a ‘no deal’ scenario, for the 
1  Erasmus+ UK National Agency, Statistics for Erasmus+ 2014–2018 (updated September 2018): https://
www.erasmusplus.org.uk/file/14130/download [accessed 2 January 2019]; Erasmus+ UK National 
Agency, ‘2019 Erasmus+ Call published’ (25 October 2018): https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/
news/2019-erasmus-call-published [accessed 2 January 2019]; European Commission, Horizon 2020 
in full swing three years on: key facts and figures 2014–2016, pp 27–28: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
horizon2020/sites/horizon2020/files/h2020_threeyearson_a4_horizontal_2018_web.pdf [accessed 7 
January 2019], and Q 42 (Chris Skidmore MP).
2  The Horizon 2020 programme is a collaborative financial instrument. Many of its funding streams 
support collaborations between academic institutions and industry partners, and there is a dedicated 
instrument to support innovative small and medium-sized companies. The Sub-Committee’s remit 
includes matters relating to home affairs, health, and education, and so this inquiry focused on 
Horizon 2020 funding for universities. Figures referenced in this report on total UK receipts from 
Horizon 2020 encompass all programme pillars, including industrial leadership.
3  ‘Erasmus+’ is the name of the EU’s programme for education, training, youth and sport for the period 
from 2014 to 2020. At the time of drafting, the successor programme to Erasmus+ is expected to be 
called simply ‘Erasmus’, although some Member States favour retaining the ‘+’ for continuity. In 
this report, we refer to the current programme as Erasmus+ and the next iteration as ‘the successor 
programme’ and ‘the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme’ interchangeably. Witnesses to this inquiry 
referred variously to both the current and successor programmes as ‘Erasmus’ and ‘Erasmus+’ or 
‘Erasmus Plus’.
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Government’s stated aim of continuing to participate in Erasmus+ and 
Horizon 2020 for the duration of the programme period. Chapter 4 considers 
options for future UK policy: whether and how the UK could become 
associated to the 2021–2027 Erasmus and Horizon Europe programmes, 
and the possibility of the UK developing its own replacement schemes. 
Cross-cutting issues including the impact of future UK immigration policy 
and ongoing uncertainty around the circumstances of UK withdrawal from 
the EU are also considered.
4. The EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, whose members are listed in 
Appendix 1, met in December 2018 and January 2019 to take evidence for 
this inquiry. We are grateful to those who gave oral evidence and to those 
who provided written submissions, all of whom are listed in Appendix 2.
5. We make this report to the House for debate.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ERASMUS AND HORIZON PROGRAMMES
Educational mobility
6. The first Erasmus (European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of 
University Students) programme was established in 1987 to give higher 
education students the opportunity to spend part of their studies abroad. 
In its first year, the programme involved 11 countries and had 3,244 
participants. Over time, the initiative has evolved and expanded and the 
current ‘Erasmus+’ programme is open to a range of participants involved 
in ‘lifelong learning’: higher education, vocational education and training 
(VET), school and adult education, youth, and sport.4 There are now 33 
Erasmus+ programme countries and the initiative supported 725,000 
‘mobilities’ in 2016.5
Erasmus+
7. Erasmus+ runs for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) period 
2014–2020. It aims to support national efforts and enhance opportunities for 
international cooperation and mobility in the fields of education, training, 
youth, and sport, and brings together all previous EU initiatives in these 
fields, including Erasmus, Youth in Action, Jean Monnet, Edulink, and 
Erasmus Mundus.6
8. Participation in Erasmus+ is open to countries within the EU and beyond on 
a ‘Programme country’ or ‘Partner country’ basis. Programme countries—
the EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Turkey, and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—are subject to all the obligations and 
requirements of Regulation 1288/2013 and can take part fully in all actions 
of the Erasmus+ programme. Partner countries participate in Erasmus+ on 
a more limited basis—subject to specific criteria or conditions—and include, 
among others, the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries, the 
Russian Federation, and Switzerland.7
9. The European Commission has ultimate responsibility for Erasmus+—
managing the programme budget, setting priorities, targets and application 
criteria, and monitoring project follow-up and evaluation—but most actions 
are implemented at the national level. These are known as ‘decentralised 
activities’, with applications and awards managed by a network of National 
Agencies overseen by responsible government departments (National 
4  European Council, ‘Celebrating 30 years of the Erasmus Programme’ (15 June 2017): https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/celebrating-30-years-of-
the-erasmus-programme [accessed 2 January 2019] and European Commission, From Erasmus to 
Erasmus+: a story of 30 years (26 January 2017): http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/sites/
erasmusplus2/files/erasmus-plus-anniversary-factsheet-02v2-hd_0.pdf [accessed 2 January 2019]
5  European Commission, From Erasmus to Erasmus+: a story of 30 years: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
erasmus-plus/anniversary/30th-anniversary-and-you-_en [accessed 7 January 2019] and European 
Commission, Erasmus+ Annual Report 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/sites/
erasmusplus2/files/annual-report-2016_en.pdf [accessed 7 January 2019]
6  Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing ‘Erasmus+’: the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing 
Decisions No 1719/2006/EC, No 1720/2006/EC and No 1298/2008/EC, OJ L 347 (20 December 
2013)
7  European Commission, Erasmus+ Programme Guide (October 2018) pp 22–24: https://ec.europa.eu/
programmes/erasmus-plus/sites/erasmusplus2/files/erasmus-plus-programme-guide-2019_en.pdf 
[accessed 2 January 2019]. Serbia will be recognised as a programme country subject to budget 
availability in 2019 and the amendment of the EU-Serbia agreement on Serbia’s participation in 
Erasmus+.
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Authorities). Various ‘centralised activities’—such as the Sport chapter, 
Jean Monnet higher education programme, and Erasmus Mundus Joint 
Master’s Degrees—are managed at the European level by the Commission’s 
Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency.8
10. With a budget of €16.45 billion for the programme period, Erasmus+ aims 
to reach over four million people through study, training, work experience, 
or volunteering abroad. Funding is distributed through annual Calls for 
Proposals, which detail available grants and application criteria according 
to the type of activity (see Box 1) and sector of the applicant organisation. 
These sectors include higher education, schools, adult education, VET, and 
youth.9
Box 1: Erasmus+ in the UK—Key Actions
Key Action 1: Mobility
Study abroad
• For students in higher education:
• Study placements of between three and 12 months;
• Monthly grants of €300–€500, depending on the country visited;
• Monthly supplement of €120 for students from ‘widening 
participation’ groups;
• Extra funding available for students with a severe disability or 
exceptional special needs;
• Contribution towards UK tuition fees for students going abroad for 
an entire academic year.
Work abroad
• For young people and VET students:
• Work or vocational training placements of between two weeks and 
12 months;
• Funding for sending organisations for project costs, activities such as 
language and intercultural preparation, extra support for people with 
special needs or those with fewer opportunities;
• Funding for participants to help support travel and subsistence costs.
8  European Commission, ‘Actions’: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/actions_en [accessed 2 
January 2019]
9 Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing ‘Erasmus+’: the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing 
Decisions No 1719/2006/EC, No 1720/2006/EC and No 1298/2008/EC, OJ L 347 (20 December 2013) 
and Erasmus+ UK National Agency, An introduction (November 2018): https://www.erasmusplus.org.
uk/file/15059/download [accessed 31 December 2018]. Erasmus+ has an overall indicative financial 
envelope of €14.774 billion under Heading 1 and of €1.680 billion under Heading 4 of the EU Budget 
for the seven years (2014–2020).
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• For students in higher education:
• Traineeships in a European enterprise of between two and 12 months;
• Monthly grants of €400–€450, depending on the country visited;
• Monthly supplement of €20 for students from ‘widening participation’ 
groups;
• Extra funding available for students with a severe disability or 
exceptional special needs;
• Contribution towards UK tuition fees for students going abroad for 
an entire academic year.
Youth exchanges
• For young people aged 13–30:
• Exchanges of between five and 21 days;
• Groups jointly carry out a work programme designed and prepared by 
them (such as workshops, exercises, debates, role-plays, simulations 
and outdoor activities).
Teach or train abroad
• For staff at schools, higher education institutions, VET and adult education 
organisations, and youth workers:
• Teaching, training, or professional development activities of between 
two days and two months;
• Funding for sending organisations for project costs, activities such as 
language and intercultural preparation, extra support for people with 
special needs or those with fewer opportunities;
• Funding for participants to help support travel and subsistence costs.
Key Action 2: Strategic partnerships
Organisations across the fields of education, training, youth, and sport can 
apply for up to €150,000 per year to develop international partnerships to share 
best practice and work collaboratively to improve and modernise practice and 
provision.
Key Action 3: Policy development
Organisations can apply for funding of up to €50,000 per project to run 
structured dialogue projects (which can last from three to 24 months) to bring 
young people and decision-makers together to inform the development of youth 
policy.
Source: Erasmus+ UK National Agency, ‘What can I do?’: https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/what-can-i-do 
[accessed 31 December 2018]
Erasmus beyond 2020
11. The Commission brought forward a draft Regulation to establish Erasmus 
in the 2021–2027 MFF period in May 2018. The 2021–2027 programme 
would maintain the same basic structure as Erasmus+—with three Key 
Actions focused on mobility, cooperation, and policy development—but 
the Commission envisages a substantial expansion of activities, with a total 
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budget of €30 billion and an ambition to reach up to 12 million participants 
over the programme period.10
12. The proposal aims to respond to some of the concerns highlighted in the 
Erasmus+ mid-term evaluation, including:
• the administrative burden of participation for smaller projects and 
organisations;
• the lack of visibility of actions in certain sectors, such as adult education; 
and
• the need to improve accessibility for individuals from disadvantaged 
backgrounds or with special needs.11
13. To address these issues, the proposal outlines plans to:
• introduce a new initiative to support 18-year-olds travelling abroad for 
the first time;
• expand mobility opportunities for current participants;
• re-introduce mobility for school pupils and low-skilled adult learners; 
and,
• improve flexibility of participation, including through ‘virtual mobility’ 
opportunities.
Efforts will be made to reduce the administrative burden for small 
organisations and new participants, and to streamline application criteria 
and monitoring and evaluation indicators.12
14. The 2021–2027 Erasmus programme will also aim to “intensify international 
mobility and cooperation with third countries”. Article 16 of the proposal 
sets out how third countries may negotiate association agreements to take 
part fully in the new programme, provided they comply with the conditions 
of their agreement and fulfil the same obligations imposed by the Regulation 
on EU Member States. Article 16 further specifies that third country 
association agreements must:
• ensure a fair balance of contributions and benefits;
• lay down the conditions of participation, including the calculation 
of financial contributions to individual programmes and their 
administrative costs;
10  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing ‘Erasmus’: 
the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 
1288/2013, COM(2018) 367
11  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing ‘Erasmus’: 
the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 
1288/2013, COM(2018) 367. See also Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Mid-
term evaluation of the Erasmus+ programme (2014–2020), COM(2018) 050
12  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing ‘Erasmus’: 
the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 
1288/2013, COM(2018) 367
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• not confer upon the third country a ‘decisional power’ on the 
programme;13
• guarantee the EU’s rights to ensure sound financial management and 
to protect its financial interests.
The proposed Regulation also provides for participation on a more limited 
basis for “third countries not associated to the programme” (Article 17).14
15. Since it was published, the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme proposal has 
been considered by various Committees of the European Parliament, and 
by the Council. Negotiations are expected to conclude before the European 
Parliament elections in 2019, although budget-related matters will form part 
of wider negotiations on the next MFF.15
Research and innovation
16. Research funding at a European level has existed since the foundation of 
the European Economic Community. It focused initially on coal, steel and 
atomic energy projects, but subsequently expanded into new areas until the 
1980s, when the decision was taken to rationalise research funding under 
a single framework. The First Framework Programme for research ran 
from 1984–1987 and had a budget of €3.3 billion. Since this time, the EU’s 
research framework programmes have continued to evolve and expand, and 
transnational cooperation has been extended to an increasing number of 
non-EU countries.16
Horizon 2020
17. Horizon 2020 is the EU’s Framework Programme for research and innovation 
for the MFF period 2014–2020. It has a total budget of nearly €80 billion 
and aims to secure Europe’s global competitiveness by driving economic 
growth and creating jobs.17
18. Horizon 2020 is structured around two-year work programmes, developed 
by the Commission, which detail specific priorities and funding areas for that 
period. Competitive calls for proposals are issued under three programme 
priorities (or ‘pillars’, see Box 2), with varying funding criteria, including 
scientific excellence, alignment with strategic objectives, geographical 
and disciplinary diversity, and potential for commercialisation. European 
13  Under current arrangements, EU Member States have a vote over work programmes drafted by 
the Commission in Programme Committee meetings. Associated third countries like Norway and 
Switzerland are typically observers on these Committees, without voting rights.
14  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing ‘Erasmus’: 
the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 
1288/2013, COM(2018) 367
15  European Parliament, Legislative train schedule: New boost for jobs, growth and investment, MFF—Erasmus 
the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport (updated 14 December 2018): http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-new-boost-for-jobs-growth-and-investment/file-mff-
erasmus [accessed 2 January 2019]
16  ‘Europe’s Framework Programmes - a key element of research policy in Europe’, Horizon: The EU 
Research & Innovation Magazine (16 December 2014): https://horizon-magazine.eu/article/europe-s-
framework-programmes-key-element-research-policy-europe.html [accessed 9 January 2019]
17  Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing Horizon 2020 - the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014–2020) 
and repealing Decision No 1982/2006/EC, OJ L 347 (20 December 2013)
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Research Council (ERC) grants are awarded solely on the basis of excellence, 
with no thematic priorities or geographical quotas.18
Box 2: The three pillars of Horizon 2020
Excellent science
This priority aims to reinforce and extend the excellence of the EU’s science base 
and consolidate the European Research Area through four specific objectives:
• the European Research Council (ERC);
• Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA);19
• Future and Emerging Technologies;
• Research infrastructures.
Industrial Leadership
This priority aims to help innovative European SMEs grow into world-leading 
companies through three specific objectives:
• Leadership in enabling and industrial technologies;
• Access to risk finance;
• Innovation in SMEs.
Societal challenges
This priority responds to the policy priorities and societal challenges identified 
in the Europe 2020 strategy and focuses funding on the following objectives:
• Health, demographic change and wellbeing;
• Food security, sustainable agriculture, marine and maritime research, and 
the bioeconomy;
• Secure, clean and efficient energy;
• Smart, green and integrated transport;
• Climate action, resource efficiency and raw materials;
• Inclusive, innovative and secure societies.
 19
Source: Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing Horizon 2020 - the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014–2020) and repealing 
Decision No 1982/2006/EC, OJ L 347 (20 December 2013)
18  Science and Technology Committee, EU membership and UK science (2nd Report, Session 2015–16, 
HL Paper 127). The European Research Council aims to reinforce the excellence, dynamism and 
creativity of European research by providing long-term funding to support excellent investigators and 
their research teams to pursue ground-breaking, high-gain/high-risk research. Scientific excellence is 
the sole criterion on which ERC grants are awarded. Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 - the Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation (2014–2020) and repealing Decision No 1982/2006/EC, OJ 
L 347 (20 December 2013)
19  Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions provide grants for all stages of researchers’ careers and encourage 
transnational, intersectoral and interdisciplinary mobility. MSCA enable research-focused organisations 
(universities, research centres, and companies) to host talented foreign researchers and create strategic 
partnerships with leading institutions worldwide. MSCA aim to equip researchers with the necessary 
skills and international experience for a successful career, either in the public or the private sector. 
European Commission, ‘Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions’: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
horizon2020/en/h2020-section/marie-sklodowska-curie-actions [accessed 17 January 2019]
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19. A network of National Contact Points—national structures established by 
the governments of EU Member States and associated third countries—
provides guidance, practical information, and assistance to current and 
potential participants on all aspects of Horizon 2020.20
20. Article 7 of the Regulation establishing Horizon 2020 sets out provisions for 
association to the programme by acceding countries, candidate and potential 
candidate countries, and selected third countries that fulfil the following 
criteria:
(a) They have a good capacity in science, technology and innovation;
(b) They have a good track record of participation in EU research and 
innovation programmes;
(c) They have close economic and geographical links to the EU; and
(d) They are EFTA members, or countries or territories listed in the Annex 
to the Regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument.
Broadly, association enables entities from associated third countries to 
participate in Horizon 2020 under the same conditions as entities from 
Member States. Specific terms and conditions for each country, including 
their financial contributions, are determined in individual association 
agreements. Associated countries can participate, but not vote, in strategic 
planning discussions.21
21. Outside of association, institutions and researchers from third countries may 
access Horizon 2020 funding under some programme themes if:
• there is a bilateral agreement which provides for such funding to the 
country where the applicant is based;
• the call for proposals specifies that applicants based in such countries 
are eligible for funding; or,
• the Commission deems the applicant’s participation essential for 
carrying out the project.
Depending on the scheme, third countries have to provide national funding 
for their participants in Horizon 2020 projects.22
Horizon Europe
22. The EU framework programme for innovation and research in 2021–2027 
will be called ‘Horizon Europe’. The proposal for a Regulation to establish 
20  European Commission, ‘National Contact Points’: https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/
desktop/en/support/national_contact_points.html [accessed 8 January 2019]
21  Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing Horizon 2020 - the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014–2020) 
and repealing Decision No 1982/2006/EC, OJ L 347 (20 December 2013). There are currently 16 
countries associated to Horizon 2020: Iceland, Norway, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Israel, Moldova, Switzerland, Faroe 
Islands, Ukraine, Tunisia, Georgia, Armenia. European Commission, Associated Countries: http://
ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/grants_manual/hi/3cpart/h2020-hi-list-ac_en.pdf 
[accessed 8 January 2019]
22  European Commission, Guidance note: Funding of applicants from non-EU countries & international 
organisations (August 2017): http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/grants_manual/
hi/3cpart/h2020-hi-3cpart_en.pdf [accessed 8 January 2019]
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Horizon Europe was published in June 2018. As with Erasmus, the proposal 
for Horizon Europe aims to build on and scale up the achievements of its 
predecessor. Its proposed budget is around €100 billion for the programme 
period.23
23. Horizon Europe will maintain a three-pillar structure, complemented by 
underpinning activities (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Horizon Europe programme pillars
European Research Council European Innovation Council
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Industrial Competitiveness
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Source: European Commission, EU Budget for the future: Horizon Europe (June 2018): https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-research-innovation_en.pdf [accessed 8 January 2018]
24. The proposal for Horizon Europe aims to address issues identified in the 
interim evaluation of Horizon 2020, including simplifying the funding 
rules to reduce the administrative burden on grant recipients and increasing 
collaboration with other EU programmes and policies, such as the EU 
Cohesion Policy, Digital Europe programme, and Connecting Europe 
Facility.24 A further objective is to strengthen international cooperation 
by promoting the participation of third countries and international 
organisations.25
25. Article 12 of the proposed Regulation sets out conditions for third country 
association to Horizon Europe, which are more detailed than those for 
Horizon 2020. Third countries must fulfil the following criteria:
(a) a good capacity in science, technology and innovation;
(b) commitment to a rules-based open market economy, including fair 
and equitable dealing with intellectual property rights, backed by 
democratic institutions;
23  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe 
- the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rule for participation and 
dissemination, COM(2018) 435 
24  Cohesion Policy: the EU’s main investment policy, targeting all regions and cities in the EU to support 
job creation, business competitiveness, economic growth, sustainable development, and improve 
quality of life. Digital Europe Programme: a new EU funding programme due to be launched in 2021 
to support the digital transformation of Europe’s societies and economies by increasing large-scale 
deployment of key digital technologies and encouraging their uptake. Connecting Europe Facility: an 
EU funding instrument to promote growth, jobs and competitiveness through targeted infrastructure 
investment at the European level.
25  European Commission, EU Budget for the future: Horizon Europe (June 2018): https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-research-innovation_en.pdf [accessed 8 
January 2018]
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(c) active promotion of policies to improve the economic and social well-
being of citizens.26
26. The basic requirements of Horizon Europe association agreements mirror 
those of the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme (see para 14), but Horizon 
Europe agreements must also take into account the objective of driving 
economic growth in the EU and ensure a balance of financial contributions 
and receipts. On the latter, Article 12(4) of the proposal specifies:
“The conditions determining the level of financial contribution shall 
ensure an automatic correction of any significant imbalance compared 
to the amount that entities established in the associated country receive 
through participation in the Programme, taking into account the costs 
in the management, execution and operation of the Programme.”27
27. Article 19 of the proposal specifies that ‘non-associated’ third countries 
should in principle bear the cost of their participation in Horizon Europe. 
However, low to middle income countries and, exceptionally, other third 
countries could be eligible for funding if the third country is identified in 
the work programme adopted by the Commission, or, if the Commission 
considers their participation essential for implementing the action.28
28. As with Erasmus, the Commission hopes to conclude negotiations on 
Horizon Europe before the European elections in May 2019.29
Impact in the UK
Erasmus+
29. Erasmus+ in the UK is managed by the UK National Agency: a partnership 
between the British Council and Ecorys UK. The Department for Education 
is the UK’s National Authority.30 Almost €1 billion is expected to be allocated 
to UK projects over the lifetime of the Erasmus+ programme. Since the 
programme began, 4,796 UK projects have been awarded €677 million in 
Erasmus+ funding and 128,097 participants took part in activities under 
Key Actions 1 and 3 between 2014 and 2016. A further €187 million will be 
available to UK organisations through the 2019 Erasmus+ funding round.31
30. The majority of Erasmus+ funding in the UK to date (72%) has been awarded 
under Key Action 1, and more than half of this sum has supported mobility 
26  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe 
- the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rule for participation and 
dissemination, COM(2018) 435
27  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe 
- the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rule for participation and 
dissemination, COM(2018) 435
28  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe 
- the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rule for participation and 
dissemination, COM(2018) 435
29  European Parliament, Legislative train schedule: New boost for jobs, growth and investment, MFF—
Proposal for a Regulation Horizon Europe - the framework programme for research and innovation 2021–2027 
(updated 14 December 2018): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-new-boost-for-
jobs-growth-and-investment/file-mff-horizon-europe-fp [accessed 8 January 2019]
30  Erasmus+ UK National Agency, ‘Erasmus+ in the UK’: https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/erasmus-in-
the-uk [accessed 10 January 2019]
31  Erasmus+ UK National Agency, Statistics for Erasmus+ 2014–2018 (updated September 2018): https://
www.erasmusplus.org.uk/file/14130/download [accessed 2 January 2019] and Erasmus+ UK National 
Agency, ‘2019 Erasmus+ Call published’ (25 October 2018): https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/
news/2019-erasmus-call-published [accessed 2 January 2019]
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in higher education. It is unsurprising, therefore, that university student 
mobility remains the most high-profile aspect of the Erasmus programme and 
that it dominated the discussion in evidence to this inquiry. Nonetheless—as 
many of our witnesses were keen to emphasise—Erasmus+ funding in the 
UK has also supported exchanges for other groups, including €114.3 million 
for vocational education and training, €43.8 million for youth, €19.8 million 
for schools, and €5.2 million for adult education. UK Key Action 2 (strategic 
partnerships) and Key Action 3 (structured dialogue) projects have been 
awarded €183.6 million and €2.7 million respectively.32
31. Witnesses to this inquiry were overwhelmingly positive about the impact of 
Erasmus+ and its predecessor programmes. The University of Aberdeen, for 
example, told us:
“That the programme is an overwhelming force for good is undisputed. 
Erasmus consistently ranks as one of the most important achievements 
of the EU.”33
32. Various witnesses highlighted the growing popularity of Erasmus+ in the UK 
over recent years. For example, 15,645 students from UK universities spent 
a period abroad through the programme in 2015–16 compared to 14,801 
in 2014–15.34 The Erasmus+ UK National Agency anticipated a significant 
increase in these numbers in the future, in light of the Commission’s proposal 
to substantially increase the budget of the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme.35
Benefits for participants
33. Gail Armistead, Associate Director of the Office of Global Engagement at 
the University of Nottingham, and representing the Russell Group, told us 
that students were “looking to be as European as possible and [saw] mobility 
and opportunities to go and study or work in Europe as vital”.36 Amatey 
Doku, Vice President (Higher Education) at the National Union of Students 
(NUS), said that Erasmus came at “the top of the list … [of] substantive 
issues that our students care about” in the context of Brexit.37 Mr Doku also 
pointed to the long-term benefit of international mobility for post-graduate 
employment prospects. Universities UK noted that impact studies of the 
programme had found:
• students who go abroad are 20% less likely to be unemployed six 
months after graduation, and are more likely to be in a graduate job 
with a higher starting salary;
• students from disadvantaged or under-represented groups have the 
most to gain from outward student mobility: for example, Asian 
students who went abroad were 43.5% less likely to be unemployed 
than their peers who did not have an international experience;
• one in three Erasmus+ work placement students are offered a job at 
their host company upon graduation;
32  Ibid.
33  Written evidence from the University of East Anglia (ESE0007)
34  Written evidence from the East of England European Partnership (ESE0030). See also written 
evidence from the University of East Anglia (ESE0007).
35  Written evidence from the Erasmus+ UK National Agency (ESE0031)
36  Q 11 (Gail Armistead)
37  Q 11 (Amatey Doku)
19BRExIT: THE ERASMUS AND HORIzON PROGRAMMES
• Erasmus+ helps students develop the ‘global skills’ businesses regularly 
ask of graduates.
Universities UK also highlighted the significance of Erasmus+ in facilitating 
international mobility, noting that 53% of UK higher education students 
who go abroad during their studies do so through the programme.38
Box 3: Experiences of Erasmus+ UK participants
Extracts from the written evidence of Mr Carl Altaner:
• “I participated in the Erasmus programme in 2016–17. It changed my life 
in the most positive sense imaginable … In a very real sense, we were all 
ambassadors for Britain. Representing our country at a grassroots level like 
this, studying and discussing issues with other young people in Europe, is 
very important.”
Extracts from written evidence from Imperial College London (feedback from 
returning Erasmus students):
• “Studying abroad definitely teaches you a lot of transferable skills, which 
employers value and you gain a wider perspective on research as a whole.”
• “The programme gave me the perspective of achieving proficiency in two 
foreign languages and of having an excellent scientific training at the same 
time.”
• “A challenging but very rewarding experience. I am now much more 
confident and culturally aware than when I started.”
Source: Written evidence from Mr Carl Altaner (ESE0001) and Imperial College London (ESE0038)
34. A number of witnesses described the ‘soft skills’ students gained through 
participation in Erasmus+. The University of Chester, for example, suggested 
there were many “incalculable” benefits of Erasmus, including providing 
students with “a real insight and understanding of another language and 
culture as well as enabling them to better understand their home culture”.39 
The East of England Partnership listed the fostering of entrepreneurship 
and strengthened independent thinking as further benefits.40 Several 
witnesses (including Carl Altaner, quoted in Box 3) described how Erasmus 
participants acted as ‘ambassadors’ for UK education institutions.41 The 
Royal Society of Edinburgh said this contributed to “the UK’s ‘public 
diplomacy’, generating positive international perceptions of the UK, and 
supporting cultural, political and trade ties”.42
Benefits to the UK
35. Witnesses also highlighted the benefits of incoming Erasmus+ students 
to the UK. The University of East Anglia believed that non-UK students 
created a “global, outward-looking culture on campus”, which improved the 
studies and the wider experience of UK students.43 MillionPlus agreed, and 
added that international students brought a “tangible economic benefit” to 
38  Written evidence from Universities UK (ESE0032)
39  Written evidence from the University of Chester (ESE0004)
40  Written evidence from the East of England European Partnership (ESE0030)
41  See for example written evidence from Imperial College London (ESE0038), The Royal Society of 
Edinburgh (ESE0045), the University of East Anglia (ESE0007), and Cardiff University (ESE0011).
42  Written evidence from The Royal Society of Edinburgh (ESE0045)
43  Written evidence from the University of East Anglia (ESE0007)
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the UK through money spent on their courses and in the local economy of 
their place of study.44
36. Jane Racz, Director of the Erasmus+ UK National Agency, believed that 
participation in Erasmus+ raised the standard of UK education and training 
through international collaboration, sharing innovations and best practice. 
Ms Racz said the programme also contributed to UK economic growth and 
prosperity by “providing opportunities for young people to develop the skills 
vital to the UK’s success in the global market, such as communications, 
critical thinking and problem-solving”.45
Increased opportunities for people from disadvantaged backgrounds
37. Several witnesses commented on the widespread association of Erasmus+ 
with studying abroad as part of a degree course. UNA Exchange described 
this focus as “misleading and exclusionary”, overlooking the impact the 
programme had on other participants such as those on vocational mobility 
schemes.46
38. John Latham, International Projects Manager at Lancashire & Morecambe 
College, and representing the Association of Colleges, described how the 
additional support Erasmus+ provided to people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds ensured mobility opportunities were available regardless 
of “social status or economic situation”, which he believed contributed 
to “general upward social mobility”. Mr Latham noted that Erasmus+ 
placements were often the first opportunity participants from his college had 
to travel abroad or indeed, for some, even “as far as the next big city”.47
39. Madeleine Rose, Deputy Director of the Erasmus+ UK National Agency, 
shared the story of Coral, a college student undertaking an electrical 
engineering course who had undertaken a three-week Erasmus+ work 
placement in Seville. Ms Rose described how Coral’s placement had changed 
her “aspirations and career”, and she had gone on to win student of the 
year at her college before progressing to an apprenticeship. Coral told the 
National Agency that her Erasmus+ experience had “made a real difference 
in the interview, because rather than just having college experience she had 
been out in the workplace”.48
Partnership projects
40. Early Years—a voluntary organisation working with children in Northern 
Ireland—drew our attention to the importance of actions supported under 
Key Action 2 (strategic partnerships). They described various initiatives they 
had been involved with—including international cooperation projects on 
Special Educational needs and early childhood educational philosophies—
which emphasised such elements as “information exchange and engagement 
44  Written evidence from MillionPlus (ESE0003). See also Higher Education Policy Institute & Kaplan 
International Pathways, The costs and benefits of international students by parliamentary constituency 
(January 2018) pp 38–39: https://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Economic-benefits-
of-international-students-by-constituency-Final-11-01-2018.pdf [accessed 3 January 2019] which 
estimates the net economic impact per international student in the UK to be £68,000 per ‘typical’ 
EU-domiciled student in the 2015/16 cohort and £95,000 per non-EU-domiciled student over the 
duration of their studies.
45  Q 26 (Jane Racz)
46  Written evidence from UNA Exchange (ESE0027)
47  Q 11 (John Latham)
48  Q 26 (Madeleine Rose)
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… sustained networks and linkages … capacity building … [and] effective 
utilisation of current best practice and evidence”.49 Mr Latham noted 
a further benefit of Erasmus+ cooperation projects, in enabling smaller 
organisations like his college to work in partnership with universities, 
national and international associations, which he said gave students “a clear 
line of sight to employment prospects and career aspirations”.50
Horizon 2020
41. Universities UK told us:
“Over the past few decades, EU programmes have been crucial in 
supporting research and innovation within UK universities.”
They pointed out that UK researchers had secured 15.2% of Horizon 2020 
funding distributed so far—a proportion second only to that received by 
Germany—which suggested the UK had been “disproportionately successful 
at competing for research funding” through the programme.51
42. Witnesses also highlighted the non-financial benefits of participation in 
Horizon 2020. The University of Cambridge, for example, thought that 
Horizon 2020 “added value … in terms of attracting and retaining the best 
scientists”.52
43. The Royal Society of Chemistry shared an analysis of the relationship 
between international collaboration and research impact, which found 
that research funded by EU programmes had a high average impact—
and a significantly higher impact than UK Government-funded research. 
These findings reinforced the role EU programmes played in “supporting 
excellent science”. The Society also described other benefits of the European 
framework programmes, including:
• bringing together people with specialist skills not found in any one 
country and accessing EU-wide collaborative networks;
• providing access to a wide range of large-scale facilities that could not 
be replicated in any one country;
• enabling students and researchers to move between countries to learn 
new skills and to share their knowledge and expertise, advancing 
science and innovation.53
44. The Wellcome Trust told us that the EU was the UK’s biggest research partner, 
with over half of UK collaborative papers co-authored with EU countries. 
They referenced case studies the Trust had collected which demonstrated 
that EU research framework programmes had reduced duplication, helped 
to establish new disciplines, and supported UK companies to engage in 
Europe (see Box 4).54
49  Written evidence from Early Years (ESE0034)
50  Q 11 (John Latham)
51  Written evidence from Universities UK (ESE0032)
52  Written evidence by University of Cambridge (ESE0044)
53  Written evidence by Royal Society of Chemistry (ESE0015)
54  Written evidence by The Wellcome Trust (ESE0025). See also Wellcome Trust, Brexit and Beyond: 
Impact case studies of EU funding (October 2018): https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/brexit-and-
beyond-impact-case-studies-201810.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]
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45. The Royal Society of Edinburgh set out key features they thought had 
underpinned the success of the UK-EU research relationship, such as the 
critical mass and strategic coordination of research endeavour, a long-term 
approach and funding environment for research, and common policy and 
regulatory frameworks.55
Box 4: Impact of Horizon 2020 funding in the UK
Case study from written evidence from Cancer Research UK:
“Because childhood cancers are so rare, collaboration is vital when it comes 
to research. In 2009, Dr Suzanne Turner founded the European Research 
Initiative on ALK-related childhood and adult cancers. This international 
research network brings together 13 partners from seven European countries 
to co-ordinate research with the goal of developing more efficient, less toxic 
therapies for children. Through ALKATRAS, a European Training Network 
developed to train the best early stage researchers in specialist techniques, 
students and early career fellows gain experience in labs across Europe. They 
are exposed to other countries’ expertise and resources, develop networks in the 
global scientific community and further deepen their understanding of cancer 
and therapies. This ground-breaking programme is only possible through a 
€4 million grant from the Horizons 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative 
Training Network.”
Extracts from ‘Brexit and Beyond: Impact case studies of EU funding’, a paper 
by the Wellcome Trust:
“In dementia research, EU funding has brought researchers together to make 
progress, faster. Professor Bart de Strooper and Professor John Hardy at UCL 
have been at the heart of a team improving progress towards a treatment for 
Alzheimer’s. A European Research Council (ERC) advanced grant drove Prof 
de Strooper to explore a new field of research before collaborative funding helped 
him and others share their methods and techniques. This identified the most 
efficient way to analyse amyloid plaques linked to dementia. A single technique 
made comparing results faster, and more effective. But crucially, through the 
Innovative Medicines Initiative, industry could pick up the technique and 
exploit it at scale. This close collaboration between academia and industry isn’t 
found in any other funding mechanism. Profs Hardy and de Strooper recently 
won the Brain Prize for ground-breaking research on Alzheimer’s interventions 
… 
“Large awards to early career researchers through ERC consolidator awards 
and Marie-Sklodowska-Curie actions, give scientists leverage to take risks. 
The UK, through its scientific leadership has traditionally taken advantage of 
this. By measuring themselves against the best from around Europe, UK-based 
researchers are sharper and more competitive. Institutes like the Dementia 
Research Institute use the EU’s competitive application process to save time on 
recruitment and increase their international visibility, improving collaborations 
and attracting staff from further afield.”
Source: Written evidence from Cancer Research UK (ESE0024) and Wellcome Trust, Brexit and Beyond: Impact 
case studies of EU funding (October 2018): https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/brexit-and-beyond-impact-
case-studies-201810.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]
55  Written evidences from the Royal Society of Edinburgh (ESE0045)
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Conclusions
46. Erasmus+ is the EU programme for education, training, youth and 
sport. In the UK, Erasmus+ funding has supported more than 4,700 
projects and 128,000 participants since the programme began. While 
many people think of Erasmus+ as a university student exchange 
scheme, the programme also extends opportunities to study, work, 
teach or train abroad to other groups, including vocational students, 
education staff and youth workers. It also supports youth exchanges, 
international partnership projects, and youth policy development. 
Witnesses were extremely positive about the impact of Erasmus+, 
particularly in terms of improving employment prospects, 
contributing to economic growth, and increasing opportunities for 
people from disadvantaged backgrounds and those with special 
needs.
47. Horizon 2020 is the EU’s framework programme for research 
and innovation. The UK has been both a significant contributor 
to and beneficiary from Horizon 2020, with the highest share of 
participants in signed grant agreements and the second highest share 
of total programme funding distributed. Witnesses agreed that the 
programme helps to raise the standard of research and supports 
excellent science in the UK, including by facilitating international 
research collaboration, providing access to large-scale research 
facilities, and attracting the best staff to work on research projects.
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CHAPTER 3: BREXIT IMPLICATIONS
48. The impact of Brexit on continued UK participation in Erasmus+ and 
Horizon 2020 will differ significantly, depending on whether the UK leaves 
the EU under the terms of the November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement (or 
an amended Withdrawal Agreement), or under a ‘no deal’ scenario.
Brexit under the November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement
49. A Withdrawal Agreement was agreed at negotiator level on 14 November 
2018 and endorsed by leaders at a special meeting of the European Council 
(EU-27) on 25 November 2018.56 If this agreement is ratified, little will 
change with regard to UK participation in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 until 
the end of the programme period, which coincides with the expected end of 
the transition period on 31 December 2020. Article 137 of the Withdrawal 
Agreement states:
“The Union programmes and activities committed under the multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2014–2020 (‘MFF 2014–2020’) or 
previous financial perspectives shall be implemented in 2019 and 2020 
with regard to the United Kingdom on the basis of the applicable Union 
law.”57
50. While participation at the practitioner level would remain much the same 
during the transition period, Article 138 of the Withdrawal Agreement 
indicates that the UK’s strategic influence would be diminished, as UK 
representatives would only attend meetings of committees that assist in 
the management of EU programmes exceptionally, “upon invitation”, and 
without voting rights.58
51. Any extension to the transition period would not encompass continued 
participation in the Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 successor programmes: 
Article 132(2)a of the Withdrawal Agreement confirms the UK would be 
“considered as a third country for the purposes of the implementation of the 
Union programmes and activities committed under the [2021–2027 MFF]”.59
52. Witnesses generally welcomed the short-term certainty that the Withdrawal 
Agreement would bring, in terms of the UK’s continued and full participation 
in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 until the end of these programmes.60 
Nonetheless, Newcastle University noted: “Due to uncertainties in the 
immediate future we remain extremely cautious.”61 With regard to Erasmus+, 
56  Department for Exiting the European Union, Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration (25 
November 2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-political-
declaration [accessed 4 January 2019]
57  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community as endorsed by leaders at a special 
meeting of the European Council on 25 November 2018 (25 November 2018) p 217: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759019/25_
November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_
Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.
pdf [accessed 4 January 2019]
58  Ibid., p 220
59  Ibid., p 207
60  See for example written evidence from the University of Edinburgh (ESE0012), Academy of Social 
Sciences and Campaign for Social Science (ESE0013), Universities UK (ESE0032), Department 
of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Education (ESE0042), Russell 
Group (ESE0047).
61  Written evidence from Newcastle University (ESE0021)
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the Russell Group was concerned that UK students and researchers might 
not be aware there were no restrictions to UK participation during the 
transition period, and called on the Government and the Commission to 
“help communicate this message as clearly and as widely as possible”.62
A ‘no deal’ Brexit
53. Under the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the 
Withdrawal Agreement may only be ratified after it has been laid before 
both Houses of Parliament, debated by the House of Lords on a ‘take 
note’ motion, and approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.63 
In line with Article 50 TEU, the agreement also requires the consent of 
the European Parliament and must be adopted by the Council by qualified 
majority.64 Failing this—and if no extension to the UK’s EU membership 
under the terms of Article 50 is sought or agreed—the UK will leave the EU 
with ‘no deal’, and the EU Treaties will cease to apply to the UK from 29 
March 2019.65
54. While the Government has confirmed its priority is to secure a negotiated 
exit under the Withdrawal Agreement, it has taken steps to prepare for the 
possibility of a ‘no deal’ outcome. In December 2018 the Cabinet agreed to 
accelerate and intensify these preparations. In addition to bringing forward 
legislation and committing additional funding, the Government has published 
more than 100 technical notices to help citizens and businesses prepare for a 
‘no deal’ Brexit. The Government has also issued an underwrite guarantee 
for projects that are successful in securing funding from EU programmes 
until the end of 2020, which would cover funding for the lifetime of those 
projects.66
Erasmus+
55. The Government’s technical notice on Erasmus+ in the UK if there’s no Brexit 
deal confirms that the underwrite guarantee depends on the Government 
reaching an agreement with the EU to allow UK organisations to 
continue to participate in Erasmus+ projects, and to bid for new funding, 
until 2020. The notice says that the Government is seeking to discuss 
and agree terms for this with the EU, and that—if these discussions are 
unsuccessful—the Government intends to “engage with member states 
and key institutions to seek to ensure UK participants can continue with 
their planned activity”.67
62  Written evidence from the Russell Group (ESE0047)
63  European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 13(1)
64  Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326 (consolidated version of 26 October 2012). On 25 November 
2018, the European Council endorsed the Withdrawal Agreement and invited the EU’s institutions 
(Commission, Council and European Parliament) to take the necessary steps to ensure that the 
Agreement is ready to come into effect on 30 March 2019. To that end, on 5 December 2018, the 
Commission agreed two proposed Council Decisions providing for the EU’s signature and conclusion 
of the Agreement which must now be agreed by the Council.
65  House of Commons Library, What if there’s no Brexit deal?, Briefing Paper 08397, December 2018
66  Department for Exiting the European Union, UK government’s preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, 
(updated 21 December 2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-governments-
preparations-for-a-no-deal-scenario/uk-governments-preparations-for-a-no-deal-scenario [accessed 
4 January 2019]
67  Department for Education, Erasmus+ in the UK if there’s no Brexit deal (23 August 2018): https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/erasmus-in-the-uk-if-theres-no-brexit-deal [accessed 3 January 
2019]. The notice also clarifies that, with regard to Erasmus+, the underwrite guarantee applies to 
funding for both centralised and decentralised actions, and whether or not the UK is the lead partner.
26 BRExIT: THE ERASMUS AND HORIzON PROGRAMMES
56. For its part, the Commission has attached the following note to the Erasmus+ 
Programme Guide:
“FOR BRITISH APPLICANTS: Please be aware that eligibility criteria 
must be complied with for the entire duration of the grant. If the United 
Kingdom withdraws from the European Union during the grant period 
without concluding an agreement with the European Union ensuring in 
particular that British applicants continue to be eligible, you will cease 
to receive EU funding (while continuing, where possible, to participate) 
or be required to leave the project on the basis of the relevant provisions 
of the grant agreement on termination.”68
Impact
57. Although witnesses to this inquiry welcomed the Government’s efforts to 
provide reassurance and continuity for Erasmus+ participants, they were 
extremely concerned about the prospect of a ‘no deal’ Brexit and the fact 
that the underwrite guarantee would be contingent on reaching a further 
agreement with the EU.69 Amatey Doku pointed out that Erasmus had not 
always been a priority in Brexit talks to date: “If a no deal comes about 
because negotiations have completely failed … the idea that this will be top of 
the agenda of things to be sorted out is completely ridiculous.”70 MillionPlus 
believed a ‘no deal’ Brexit would cause “inevitable disruption”, which the 
Government could only seek to mitigate.71
58. Universities UK told us that, “to maximise certainty and stability”, the 
Government needed to provide further information on the practical 
operation of the underwrite guarantee.72 The Universities of Surrey and 
Newcastle agreed that the Erasmus+ UK National Agency should manage the 
distribution of underwrite funds and highlighted the importance of ensuring 
there was continuity in the timeframe of grant payments and in reporting 
systems.73 The UK in a Changing Europe pointed out that Erasmus grants 
were staggered over the lifetime of the project:
“The government would need to have a mechanism for establishing how 
much money has already been given to projects prior to withdrawal and 
68  European Commission, ‘Erasmus+ Programme Guide: Eligible countries’: https://ec.europa.eu/
programmes/erasmus-plus/programme-guide/part-a/who-can-participate/eligible-countries_en 
[accessed 3 January 2019]. On 30 January 2019, as this report was being agreed, the European 
Commission published proposed ‘no deal’ contingency measures relating to Erasmus+. This proposal 
establishes that in, a ‘no deal’ scenario, all mobility activities under the current Erasmus+ programme 
that started before 30 March 2019 will be funded until they are completed (for a maximum of up to 
12 months). This will include UK participants engaged in mobility activities in the EU countries 
and vice-versa. This legislation will need to be approved and adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council before 30 March 2019 to avoid any disruption to Erasmus+ placements in the event 
of a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down provisions for the continuation of ongoing learning mobility activities under the Erasmus+ 
programme in the context of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (“United Kingdom”) from the European Union, COM(2019) 64
69  See for example written evidence from the Association of UK Higher Education European Officers 
(HEURO) (ESE0010), the University of Surrey (ESE0016), Newcastle University (ESE0021), and 
The Royal Society of Edinburgh (ESE0045).
70  Q 13 (Amatey Doku)
71  Written evidence from MillionPlus (ESE0003)
72  Written evidence from Universities UK (ESE0032)
73  Written evidence from the University of Surrey (ESE0016) and Newcastle University (ESE0021)
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how much (if any) might have to return to the EU, in order to be able to 
fulfil its commitment to cover any spending gap.”74
59. The Erasmus+ UK National Agency confirmed that they had provided the 
Government with information on projects that would be “in motion” at the 
point of Brexit, which they estimated at about 2,000 ‘live’ projects with a 
total value of €278.9 million.75 Jane Racz also said that the National Agency 
was “working on the assumption that [they] would be best placed and would 
support in delivering that guarantee”.76
60. The University of Cambridge noted that the success of Erasmus+ funding 
applications made in February 2019 would not be confirmed until May, after 
the UK had left the EU, at which point continued participation in Erasmus+ 
might not be possible if the UK and EU had not reached an agreement on 
the application of the underwrite guarantee. The University believed there 
was a “very short timeframe available to have these discussions and finalise 
arrangements”, as students would need to finalise their mobility plans for the 
2019–20 academic year and travel abroad from the early summer.77
61. Several witnesses commented on the impact of ongoing uncertainty over the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The University of Nottingham suggested 
that school age students might be deterred from taking up degree pathways 
that involved mobility to Europe, from fear of the “many unknowns that a no 
deal Brexit would deliver”.78 The British Library told us they were awaiting a 
decision on an application to extend their Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs 
exchange programme, and had been informed that activities involving UK 
partners in the scheme would “cease immediately” under a ‘no deal’ Brexit.79 
John Latham said his organisation had been invited to participate in fewer 
Erasmus+ projects this year, which he put down to “the uncertainty over 
Brexit” and people “erring on the side of caution” due to the substantial 
amounts of money involved in partnership projects.80 UNA Exchange told 
us that ongoing uncertainty was causing such anxiety that they anticipated 
some Erasmus+ participants would finish their placements early and return 
home in April 2019.81
62. Amatey Doku highlighted the potential impact of sudden changes to the 
immigration status of Erasmus+ participants abroad at the point of a ‘no 
deal’ Brexit: “We may see a situation where embassies and high commissions 
in Europe get involved in trying to get people back home and vice versa.” 
Mr Doku described a ‘no deal’ Brexit as “catastrophic”, and said that the 
Government’s underwrite guarantee had not sufficed to reassure Erasmus+ 
applicants and students.82
63. The University of Nottingham regarded a transition period as “vital” to 
give the Government and UK participating organisations time to liaise with 
74  Written evidence from the UK in a Changing Europe (ESE0037)
75  Q 28 (Madeleine Rose). See also supplementary written evidence from the Erasmus+ UK National 
Agency (ESE0049).
76  Q 30 (Jane Racz)
77  Written evidence from the University of Cambridge (ESE0044)
78  Written evidence from the University of Nottingham (ESE0008)
79  Written evidence from the British Library (ESE0043)
80  Q 12 (John Latham)
81  Written evidence from UNA Exchange (ESE0027)
82  QQ 12-13 (Amatey Doku)
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Erasmus+ partners in Europe to secure cooperation and to advise on any 
immigration status changes.83
Horizon 2020
64. The Government’s underwrite guarantee, described above, applies to 
Horizon 2020 and would cover funding for UK participants in consortia 
which submit successful bids to Horizon 2020 before the UK leaves the EU 
for the full duration of the projects. As with Erasmus+, this is subject to the 
UK reaching an agreement with the EU on the continued eligibility of UK 
participants.84
65. The Government’s technical notice on Horizon 2020 funding if there’s no 
Brexit deal notes other potential issues with the application of the underwrite 
guarantee, including in cases where UK participants lead a consortium and 
distribute funds to other participants, and the implications for consortia 
which would not comply with EU Member State participation thresholds 
after the UK becomes a third country. The notice says that the Government 
is seeking to discuss how to address these issues with the Commission to 
ensure UK organisations can apply to and participate in Horizon 2020 calls 
from March 2019, with funding provided through the underwrite guarantee.85
66. The technical notice acknowledges that the underwrite guarantee would 
not cover some major components of Horizon 2020—including European 
Research Council (ERC) grants, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), 
and the SME pillar—as they are not open to third country participation. 
It confirms the Government is “considering what other measures may be 
necessary to support UK research and innovation” if UK organisations 
become ineligible to receive funding from these programmes in the event of 
‘no deal’.86
67. The Government issued a further update in December 2018, which 
confirmed that UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) will manage the 
underwrite guarantee for Horizon 2020 projects. The update invited current 
UK recipients of Horizon 2020 funding to register their details through 
a dedicated portal—as data on programme participants is held by the 
European Commission—and said UKRI would keep them informed about 
the implementation of underwrite payments.87
68. The European Commission has published a note for UK applicants on the 
Horizon 2020 ‘participant portal’, which confirms:
“If the United Kingdom withdraws from the EU during the grant period 
without concluding an agreement with the EU ensuring in particular 
that British applicants continue to be eligible, you will cease to be eligible 
to receive EU funding (while continuing, where possible, to participate) 
83  Written evidence from the University of Nottingham (ESE0008)
84  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,’ Horizon 2020 funding if there’s no Brexit 
deal’ (August 2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/horizon-2020-funding-if-theres-
no-brexit-deal/horizon-2020-funding-if-theres-no-brexit-deal--2 [accessed 9 January 2019]
85  Ibid.
86  Ibid.
87  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK participation in Horizon 2020: UK government 
overview (December 2018) p 10: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/766510/horizon-2020-government-overview-december-2018-update.
pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]
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or be required to leave the project on the basis of Article 50 of the grant 
agreement.”88
Impact
69. Professor Andrew Thompson, Executive Chair of the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council, and representing UKRI, estimated there could be 10,000 
UK “live participations”89 and “a number of in-flight [UK] applications” to 
Horizon 2020 on 29 March 2019. He set out three potential scenarios for the 
operation of the Government’s underwrite guarantee:
(a) the Commission would agree to administer the underwrite on the UK’s 
behalf (in Prof Thompson’s view, the “optimal scenario”);
(b) the Commission would require the UK to administer the underwrite 
but would provide data on UK Horizon 2020 participants to enable it 
to do so;
(c) the Commission would not administer the underwrite or provide the 
UK with relevant data.
Prof Thompson acknowledged it was “challenging” for UKRI to plan for 
all these scenarios, but thought they were “as on top of it at the moment 
as you reasonably or realistically could expect us to be”. He reported the 
Commission had been unwilling to discuss the technicalities of possible ‘no 
deal’ scenarios with the UK, as it was focused on the Withdrawal Agreement.90
70. Newcastle University thought the “least disruptive” way of managing the 
underwrite guarantee would be for the funding to be channelled through 
the Commission, which would then be “reimbursed” by the UK.91 Imperial 
College London recommended that underwrite funding should be paid in 
euros and should be subject to the same terms and conditions—and grant 
disbursal and reporting timetables—set out in the original Horizon 2020 
funding calls and individual grant agreements.92
71. Notwithstanding the need to secure the EU’s agreement to continued UK 
eligibility, Universities UK were reassured that the underwrite guarantee 
would ensure the “vast majority” of Horizon 2020 projects involving UK 
researchers would not be affected in a ‘no deal’ scenario. Nonetheless, they 
observed:
“The uncertainty created by the possibility of a no deal Brexit has had a 
negative impact on the willingness of EU researchers to collaborate with 
UK counterparts in EU funding calls. This is demonstrated by the drop 
in funding received by UK researchers through collaborative projects in 
the ‘Societal Challenges’ pillar of Horizon 2020.”93
88  European Commission Participant Portal H2020 Online Manual, ‘Find partners or apply as 
individual’: http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/docs/h2020-funding-guide/grants/applying-for-
funding/find-partners_en.htm [accessed 14 December 2018]
89  Project “participations” refers to the number of times UK entities are involved in Horizon 2020 
projects, rather than the number of individuals working on those projects. There are therefore no 
exact figures for the number of individuals that will be involved in UK Horizon 2020 projects on 29 
March 2019. Supplementary written evidence from Chris Skidmore MP (ESE0050)
90  QQ 20–21 (Prof Thompson)
91  Written evidence from Newcastle University (ESE0021)
92  Written evidence from Imperial College London (ESE0038)
93  Written evidence from Universities UK (ESE0032)
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72. Vivienne Stern, the Director of Universities UK International, told us that 
the underwrite guarantee had been “good up to a point”, but further detail 
was now needed about how the “flows of money” would work in practice 
and on other technical issues like grant audit requirements. Ms Stern also 
highlighted the issue of the UK becoming ineligible, as a third country, to 
access ERC and MSCA, which she said accounted for “about 60% of all the 
funding that the UK wins” from Horizon 2020.94
73. The Royal Society put the value of these programmes to the UK at 
approximately £0.5 billion per annum. They added: “It could take years to 
develop alternatives, meaning that valuable research could be stopped in its 
tracks and the UK risks losing valuable people and projects.”95
74. Dr Beth Thompson, Head of UK & EU Policy at the Wellcome Trust, said 
the Government’s underwrite guarantee had not succeeded in “stemming all 
the uncertainty” surrounding a potential ‘no deal’ scenario. Dr Thompson 
described anecdotal reports of UK researchers receiving “signals” from EU 
colleagues that they should not attempt to lead—or even that they should 
step away entirely from—Horizon 2020 consortia bids.96
75. The University of Cambridge told us:
“Despite recent announcements of the Government’s guarantee to 
underwrite UK participation, EU partners are increasingly concerned 
about including UK partners in project proposals and are attempting to 
withhold payments.”97
76. Cancer Research UK thought a ‘no deal’ Brexit could cause “significant 
immediate disruption to the collaborative research environment”, by 
impeding short-term travel for cross-border working, including conferences, 
teaching, and shared projects such as clinical trials. They were also concerned 
by the prospect of EU researchers becoming subject to the UK’s non-EEA 
immigration system from March 2019 if the UK left the EU without a deal, 
as they considered the system “expensive for researchers” and “resource-
intensive” for employers.98
77. The UK in a Changing Europe suggested that collaborative research 
projects could be disrupted because of the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) restrictions on sharing data with third countries. They 
acknowledged the Government’s indication that it would not impose any 
restrictions on data-sharing in a ‘no deal’ scenario but warned there was no 
guarantee the EU would “follow suit”.99
94  Q 5 (Vivienne Stern). We note that the Government’s figures indicate ERC and MSCA grants account 
for approximately 44% of total UK receipts from Horizon 2020 to date. Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘UK participation in horizon 2020: September 2018’ (November 
2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-participation-in-horizon-2020-september-2018 
[accessed 24 January 2019].
95  Written evidence from The Royal Society (ESE0046)
96  QQ 4–5 (Dr Thompson)
97  Written evidence from the University of Cambridge (ESE0044)
98  Written evidence from Cancer Research UK (ESE0024)
99  Written evidence from The UK in a Changing Europe (ESE0037). See also European Union 
Committee, Brexit: the EU Data Protection package (3rd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 7).
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78. Dr Thompson drew our attention to the importance of regulatory alignment 
for cross-border clinical trials:
“At the moment we operate clinical trials under a UK regulation based 
on an EU directive … Broadly, the rules on clinical trials are harmonised 
and that makes it reasonably easy to run your trials across multiple sites 
… the legal status of that is going to be challenging … the UK regulator 
has put out no-deal guidance, but there is a lot more work to do before 
the people on the ground doing those trials really understand what is 
going to happen to them.”100
The Government’s position
79. Written evidence to this inquiry from the Department for Business, Energy 
& Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Department for Education (DfE) 
emphasised that the Government was “determined to support UK science 
and education in all scenarios”, and that losing international mobility and 
research opportunities was “in nobody’s interest”.101
80. The Departments confirmed that the Withdrawal Agreement would ensure 
the continued implementation of EU programmes under the current MFF 
in the UK with no restrictions until the end of the transition period on 31 
December 2020. As such, they expected the “normal funding application 
processes” for Erasmus+ would remain the same during this period. For 
Horizon 2020, however, they said funding could be restricted “to a certain 
extent”, if it related to financial instruments decided after the Withdrawal 
Agreement entered into force—such as InnovFin—or if participation would 
grant access to “security-related, sensitive information” that was restricted 
to Member States.102
81. Chris Skidmore MP, Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research 
and Innovation, confirmed that he strongly believed Erasmus+ and Horizon 
2020 were worthwhile for UK students and the UK’s “world leading” 
research communities. He stressed that ratifying the Withdrawal Agreement 
was the Government’s priority and underlined the “absolute importance” 
of achieving this to ensure the UK’s continued participation in both 
programmes.103
82. Regarding preparations for a ‘no deal’ scenario, the Minister told us he 
was part of a group of ministers—led by the Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union—which met weekly to “discuss arrangements”. He 
continued: “That is where, working with the Treasury, the nature of the 
government guarantees and the underwrites will become apparent, if we 
move into no-deal territory.”104
100  Q 6 (Dr Thompson)
101  Written evidence from the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and the Department 
for Education (BEIS/DfE) (ESE0042)
102  Written evidence from BEIS/DfE (ESE0042). InnovFin—or EU Finance for Innovators—is a joint 
initiative launched by the European Investment Bank and the European Commission under Horizon 
2020 to facilitate and accelerate access to finance for innovative businesses and other innovative 
entities in Europe. European Investment Bank, ‘InnovFin: EU Finance for innovators’: http://www.
eib.org/en/products/blending/innovfin/index.htm [accessed 11 January 2019]
103  Q 34 (Chris Skidmore MP)
104  Q 36 (Chris Skidmore MP)
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83. The Minister told us that further information on the operation of the 
underwrite guarantee would be issued if ‘no deal’ became “a reality”.105 
Sarah Redwood, Deputy Director for European Programmes (International 
Science and Innovation) at BEIS, confirmed:
“We are trying to keep the terms and conditions [of underwrite funding] 
as aligned as possible with the EU to make it as simple as possible for the 
beneficiaries so that the transition is as smooth as possible.”106
Shahid Omer, Deputy Director for International Higher Education and 
EU Exit at the DfE, said the Government was ready to provide advice to 
Erasmus+ participants planning exchanges after exit day, but did not want 
people to “disrupt their plans now because the world might change in a 
couple of weeks”.107
84. The Minister was keen to emphasise the Government’s underwrite 
guarantee was “for the duration of the projects”, and said he was determined 
to provide UK participants with certainty and the “confidence to continue”. 
He confirmed, however, that the underwrite guarantee did not extend to 
programmes not open to third countries—including the ERC and MSCA—
and said he was “keen to work with the scientific community” on possible 
alternative funding streams.108
85. On the need to reach an agreement with the EU on the continued eligibility 
of UK organisations to participate in Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ in a ‘no 
deal’ scenario—with funding provided by the Government’s underwrite 
guarantee—the Minister explained that the Commission would “not 
actively engage in any negotiations” on this until the House of Commons 
had voted on the Withdrawal Agreement and it had “certainty about the 
UK’s position”. The Minister confirmed that he had contacted the relevant 
Commissioners to try to ensure a framework was in place for officials to 
begin work as soon as there was certainty “on the processes of what might 
take place”.109 He also expressed the hope, with regard to Erasmus+, that 
the fact the UK contributed “about £1.8 billion” to the programme, and 
got “maybe £1 billion-worth of placements back”, would lead to a “special 
willingness” on the part of the Commission to ensure the UK retained access 
to the programme after 29 March 2019.110
86. When asked about the possibility of securing rapid agreement on UK association 
or interim arrangements to preserve access to Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ in 
a ‘no deal’ scenario, the Minister explained that the UK would not be able to 
begin discussions on association while it was still a Member State. He also noted 
the lack of time available to negotiate such arrangements, which he said could 
“take a matter of months, if not between nine months and a year”.111
87. Sarah Redwood acknowledged the importance of regulatory alignment 
in facilitating international research collaboration. She noted the UK was 
already aligned with the EU on data protection, thanks to the Data Protection 
Act 2018, and said the UK and the EU were “ready to work quickly to sustain 
105  Q 37 (Chris Skidmore MP)
106  Q 37 (Sarah Redwood)
107  Q 39 (Shahid Omer)
108  QQ 37–38 (Chris Skidmore MP)
109  Q 37 (Chris Skidmore MP)
110  Q 39 (Chris Skidmore MP)
111  Q 36 (Chris Skidmore MP)
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the flows of data that are really important”. The Government was also 
“committed to being aligned as much as possible with the new EU clinical 
trials regulation”, when that was implemented. On chemical registration, she 
confirmed the UK and the EU had agreed they would “explore the possibility 
of co-operation between the UK authorities and the relevant authorities in 
the EU to ensure alignment as much as possible”.112
Conclusions
88. The Withdrawal Agreement would ensure that UK participation in 
Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 could continue largely unchanged but 
only until the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework 
period, at the end of 2020. We note that uncertainty about whether 
this Agreement will be ratified is a matter of concern to current and 
potential UK participants in these programmes.
89. The Government has guaranteed to underwrite funding for successful 
UK bids to EU programmes until the end of 2020, if the UK leaves 
the EU without a deal. However, the Government still needs to agree 
terms with the EU for UK organisations to continue to participate in 
Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 projects as third country entities.
90. We note the European Commission’s current unwillingness to engage 
in discussions on possible actions to protect people on Erasmus+ 
exchanges and Horizon 2020 projects in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, 
but urge the Government to continue its efforts to reach a resolution 
with the Commission to avoid disruption. We remain extremely 
concerned about the lack of time available to negotiate and confirm 
these ‘no deal’ contingency plans. If a resolution cannot be agreed, the 
Government should use funds set aside for the underwrite guarantee 
to establish replacement UK mobility and research funding schemes 
as quickly as possible.
91. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, provide further 
information on how it intends the underwrite guarantee to operate in 
practice, including who will disburse the funding and what terms and 
conditions will apply to beneficiaries. We recommend that schedules 
for releasing payments and monitoring and reporting systems 
should be as similar to those set out in the original grant agreements 
as possible, to provide certainty and minimise disruption for UK 
participants transitioning to the new system.
92. Of particular concern to the UK’s research community is the loss 
of access to key sources of UK Horizon 2020 funding, including the 
European Research Council and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, 
which are not open to third country participation and so are not 
covered by the underwrite guarantee. We note that the Government is 
keenly aware of this issue and emphasise the importance of confirming 
replacements for these funding streams as soon as possible.
93. We welcome indications that the UK and EU are willing to work 
together on the free flow of data and regulatory alignment with regard 
to clinical trials and chemical registration. This will be essential to 
facilitate continued international research collaboration.
112  Q 45 (Sarah Redwood)
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CHAPTER 4: FUTURE UK POLICY OPTIONS
94. The Political Declaration on the future UK-EU relationship—agreed at 
negotiator level in November 2018—states that the Parties will:
• establish general “principles, terms and conditions” for UK participation 
in EU programmes “such as science and innovation, and youth, culture 
and education”, including a fair and appropriate financial contribution 
and fair treatment of participants;
• explore UK participation in European Research Infrastructure 
Consortiums, taking into account the level of UK participation in EU 
science and innovation programmes; and,
• engage in dialogue and exchanges to identify opportunities to cooperate 
and share best practice and expertise in areas of shared interest, 
including areas such as culture, education, science and innovation.113
95. As noted in Chapter 2, the UK could seek to participate in the next Erasmus 
programme and Horizon Europe through full association or more limited 
involvement as a ‘non-associated’ third country. Witnesses suggested that—
either in addition to continued participation in EU programmes or as an 
alternative if this does not prove possible or desirable—the Government 
could establish new UK international mobility and research programmes. 
These options, along with the implications of cross-cutting issues including 
immigration policy and ongoing uncertainty about the terms of the future 
UK-EU relationship, are considered below.
Continued participation in EU programmes
Association: Erasmus: 2021–2027
96. As we have seen, witnesses were extremely positive about the impact 
of Erasmus in the UK to date. It is therefore unsurprising that they 
overwhelmingly supported full association to the successor to Erasmus+. 
Several witnesses were also keen to stress that the UK would have the option 
of seeking full association to the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme, whether it 
left the EU with a deal or not.114
97. The University of East Anglia told us:
“Erasmus+ is unique in that it offers additional funding to support 
students with specific, ongoing medical needs or disabilities, enabling 
them to still travel with appropriate medical support, or to fund regular 
travel back to the UK for required ongoing treatment/medical check-
ups. There are no other similar, universal grants for such students to 
study abroad.”115
113  Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union 
and the United Kingdom (November 2018) p 4: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759021/25_November_Political_Declaration_setting_
out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_
Kingdom__.pdf [accessed 10 January 2019]
114  See for example written evidence from the University of Nottingham (ESE0008), the National Union 
of Students (ESE0041), Q 10 (Prof Andrew Thompson).
115  Written evidence from the University of East Anglia (ESE0007)
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98. The Association of UK Higher Education European Officers (HEURO) 
said that students from lower income backgrounds would be “excluded from 
participating in an international sojourn” without the additional funding 
provided by Erasmus.116 UNA Exchange highlighted the importance of 
the vocational elements of Erasmus, which they believed had “the most 
significant impact on young people with fewer opportunities—those furthest 
from the labour market and most at risk of social exclusion”.117
99. Universities UK pointed to the Commission’s proposal to increase mobility 
opportunities by doubling the overall budget for the 2021–2027 Erasmus 
programme and implementing measures to improve accessibility and 
flexibility for disadvantaged students. They suggested these steps aligned 
well with UK priorities.118
100. Several universities mentioned the centrality of Erasmus to their degree 
programmes. The University of Surrey, for example, told us: “We have 
redesigned two of our Business courses to enable students to spend a year or 
semester at a European Business School under the Erasmus programme.”119 
The University of Oxford highlighted the European focus of their Modern 
Languages degrees, and said their Law department’s “long-standing 
endeavours to build and foster links with participating Erasmus countries 
would be severely hampered” without continued UK involvement in the 
programme.120
101. Gail Armistead concluded:
“[Erasmus] is a life-changing experience for many of our students. 
When those students come up to graduation, many of them reflect 
on the experience they have had, and they have so much potential to 
offer employers in the future. You look at that and feel that is why we 
are all fighting to stay in it, because we want to continue to offer those 
opportunities to students and broaden them out.”121
102. Several witnesses thought that the EU would welcome the UK’s continued 
participation in Erasmus and, indeed, that this would be of mutual benefit. 
Newcastle University thought the UK was “an attractive destination” for 
international students, and the University of Cambridge told us that the UK 
was the third most popular destination country for Erasmus students.122 The 
Russell Group noted that both the European Parliament and the EU’s Chief 
Negotiator, Michel Barnier, had mentioned Erasmus as a likely area of future 
UK-EU cooperation.123 Gail Armistead confirmed she was getting “very 
positive messages” from European partners, who were “overwhelmingly 
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supportive” of the UK’s continued participation in Erasmus.124 Jane Racz 
said that other National Agencies valued mobility to and from the UK and 
that she had not seen “any negativity at all” regarding the UK’s continued 
participation in Erasmus.125
103. The University of Surrey thought that continued participation would depend 
on whether the UK was “prepared to pay the price”.126 The University 
of Nottingham noted that—with an increased overall budget—the costs 
of participating in the next Erasmus programme could be higher than at 
present,127 though the University of Edinburgh did not think the level of 
financial contributions required would be “prohibitive”.128
104. A number of witnesses commented on the UK’s ability to influence the 
programme as an associated country without voting rights.129 The University 
of Bristol: Research Development International/International Office thought 
it “highly unlikely” the UK would have any influence over Erasmus after 29 
March 2019”.130 John Latham, in contrast, said that non-EU programme 
countries like Norway and Turkey were “big players” and “valued partners” 
in the current Erasmus+ programme.131 Jane Racz pointed out that the UK 
would still be able to attend Erasmus+ programme meetings which, she said, 
operated “more on a collaborative basis”, and in which voting was “very 
rare”.132
105. Amatey Doku agreed that the means by which stakeholders such as the 
NUS influenced the programme in the past were “often quite informal” and 
“about relationships”, but warned:
“The broader political question is that, if we have a traumatic exit from 
the European Union, it would permeate the negotiating teams on both 
sides. It would become much harder to have a say on things such as this 
if the broader divorce, if you will, is not very pleasant.”133
Mr Doku was also concerned that potential changes to the immigration status 
of EU nationals in the UK would cause the UK to lose “some of the capital” 
it currently had in conversations about future association to Erasmus.134
106. The Royal Society of Edinburgh observed that the free movement of 
Erasmus participants was a “key principle” in bilateral agreements with 
non-EU programme countries.135 Other witnesses pointed to the experience 
of Switzerland, which lost full access to EU education projects including 
Erasmus following its 2014 referendum on free movement, and as a result 
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had to set up its own ‘mirrored arrangements’ in a Swiss-European Mobility 
Programme (SEMP).136
Association: Horizon Europe
107. MillionPlus believed:
“As a future relationship, the best scenario would be one whereby the 
UK continues to have full access to research funding and collaborative 
programmes, so that universities can participate, and lead, in pan-
European projects.”137
Prof Thompson agreed, noting that “full associated status” would allow the 
UK to “continue to access framework programmes for research in the future 
under the same conditions as Member States”.138
108. London Higher told us that a UK-EU association agreement for Horizon 
Europe would depend upon how much the UK was willing to pay for access. 
They highlighted the “method of financial rebalancing” set out in the 
programme proposal, and called for the UK to agree a “meaningful” level 
of contributions to ensure the UK research community was not “frozen out 
of participation in a world-leading research ecosystem”.139 The University of 
Edinburgh agreed a commitment by the UK to provide matching funding 
was justified, emphasising that the “value of EU research funding [could 
not] be measured solely in financial terms”.140
109. The University of East Anglia noted that accepting complete free movement 
was not “a specific prerequisite” for association to Horizon 2020, but 
thought the free movement of researchers and research goods—such as 
scientific equipment—would be necessary for participation in EU framework 
programmes.141
110. On the level of influence the UK could expect to have over Horizon Europe, 
Vivienne Stern said the UK had historically “carried a lot of weight … in 
the big discussions” on EU framework programmes. While Brexit and 
uncertainty around future association had “diluted” the UK’s impact 
on the debates on Horizon Europe, she expected the UK would “remain 
an influential voice at the European level” with regard to research and 
innovation.142 The University of Oxford noted that association would give the 
UK “observer status in [Horizon Europe’s] programme committees but no 
vote”. Nonetheless, they explained that countries associated to Horizon 2020 
had found it was scientists rather than politicians who shaped the funding 
programmes, and said that topics and content in committee meetings (where 
the work programmes [were] agreed) were “decided by consensus”.143
111. In contrast, Newcastle University believed that the UK’s ability to “indirectly 
influence” Horizon Europe as an associate country would be “tactically 
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difficult”.144 The Royal Society of Edinburgh described the potential loss of 
UK influence over the programme as a “significant issue”, and called on the 
UK and the EU to explore “the merit and feasibility of establishing a joint 
UK-EU strategic committee that would enable the parties to strategically 
align their programmes and capital investments in higher education, research 
and innovation”.145
112. Other witnesses highlighted possible channels of influence outside the 
programme committees, including Science Europe (an association of 
European Research Funding and Research Performing Organisations), 
UKRI’s Brussels office, and the European scientific academies.146
113. The Russell Group argued it was important to “strike the right tone” when 
considering influence: the UK should make it clear that it accepted the 
implications of its decision to leave the EU for the “methods of influence” 
it would have in EU programmes. They thought that “‘influence’ should 
not be seen as political influence, but rather about ensuring appropriate 
accountability for UK funds being spent via EU research and innovation 
framework programmes”.147
114. The Royal Society thought there would be an inevitable “period of 
uncertainty for UK-based researchers and businesses over the future funding 
environment”, because the UK would not be able to confirm association 
to Horizon Europe until negotiations on the programme concluded. They 
continued:
“The UK government could ameliorate the damage that this may do 
to UK confidence and send a clear message of its intention to seek 
association by committing the public money in the upcoming Spending 
Review to buy into Horizon Europe once it is agreed.”148
115. Imperial College London suggested the Government’s underwrite guarantee 
could provide the basis for a “shadow programme” to “cover any potential 
funding gap caused by any delays in association” to Horizon Europe.149
116. As for the likely attitude of the EU towards UK association to Horizon 
Europe, several witnesses drew our attention to the July 2017 report of the 
independent High Level Group on maximising the impact of EU Research & 
Innovation Programmes, chaired by Pascal Lamy.150 This report concluded:
“Whatever Brexit modalities are agreed between the UK and the EU by 
2019, full and continued engagement with the UK within the post-2020 
EU R&I programme remains an obvious win-win for the UK and the EU. 
The UK has one of the strongest science bases of all European countries. 
A positive cooperation model (e.g., based on mutual investment) should 
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be established, so that the UK remains part of the European Research 
Area.”151
Witnesses also highlighted that the UK was “a major contributor to Horizon 
2020 in expertise, budget contribution and scale”,152 and suggested the EU 
was “at risk of losing one of the top-ranking R&D powerhouses”.153
Non-associated third country participation
Erasmus 2021–2027
117. Witnesses were clear that participation in the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme 
as a non-associated third country—a ‘partner country’ under Erasmus+ 
terminology—was a less desirable option than full association.
118. The University of Aberdeen explained that “the funding available would be 
much lower” and said the UK would be “reliant on partners in programme 
countries to manage projects and funding on our behalf”.154 The University 
of Cambridge agreed that partner country status would reduce the role of 
UK universities in “renewing and developing institutional partnerships”, 
and “limit opportunities for students to undertake work placements under 
Erasmus”.155 London Higher believed that full association would put the UK 
“in a much better position to influence the programme” compared to the 
“informal lobbying role” it would have as a non-associated third country.156
119. A number of witnesses cited the Swiss-European Mobility Programme 
(SEMP) as an example of the disadvantages of partner country status versus 
full association. The University of East Anglia, for example, noted that the 
Swiss Government must provide funding for both incoming and outgoing 
students and, consequently, has had to impose caps on the sectors and 
numbers of participants that can access it.157 The East of England European 
Partnership identified as drawbacks the refusal of some previous partners to 
agree replacement bilateral agreements when Switzerland left Erasmus, and 
the fact that SEMP offers no substitutes for many Erasmus+ actions, such 
as work placements and cooperation projects.158 Liz Simpson, Study Abroad 
Officer at the University of Leeds, told us:
“My understanding is that the Swiss model … is costly and feedback 
from Swiss colleagues suggests they would prefer to be part of the 
Erasmus programme moving forward.”159
Horizon Europe
120. Dr Thompson observed there were “substantial differences between 
associated country status and third country status” in EU research framework 
programmes, with ‘non-associated’ third countries unable to lead projects or 
receive funding from single beneficiary schemes like the ERC and MSCA. It 
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was “critical” for the UK to secure full association to preserve access to these 
important features.160
121. The Wellcome Trust was concerned that, as a ‘non-associated’ third country, 
the UK would lose access to EU joint infrastructure, or that this would only 
be available on an ad hoc basis and for a fee. They warned: “EU researchers 
already face long queues to access some infrastructure, it is likely UK 
researchers would be a lower priority.”161
122. Universities UK thought that universities would want to participate in the 
parts of Horizon Europe open to third countries even if the UK could not 
secure full association, as this would still offer a “unique array of collaboration 
opportunities that [could not] be replicated at a domestic level”. They 
emphasised funding would be required to support any UK participation, 
and to replace the ERC and MSCA programmes.162
No participation in EU programmes
Implications for educational mobility
123. Witnesses saw the ending of UK participation in Erasmus as the least 
desirable outcome. Some universities suggested that people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and those with medical needs or disabilities 
would be disproportionately affected due to losing access to the additional 
financial support they received through the programme.163 Gail Armistead 
pointed out that it was Government policy—and a priority for the university 
sector—to “increase accessibility and ensure greater diversity” in the group 
of students participating in mobility opportunities. The loss of Erasmus 
funding would thus be “the exact opposite” of what the Government was 
trying to achieve internationally.164
124. John Latham believed that VET “mobility opportunities would stop in their 
tracks” without Erasmus funding, or would be restricted to “those who can 
afford to go”. Asked about the potential to establish new arrangements with 
countries outside Europe, Mr Latham explained:
“In the vocational area, you are possibly talking about short-term 
mobility placements for students who have special needs or difficult 
circumstances at home. Europe is their destination. It is a short trip… 
While a mobility experience in Canada or Australia sounds a really great 
opportunity and I would welcome it on top of Erasmus+, it is possibly 
too risky to start looking at those opportunities when our real partners 
are on our doorstep.”165
125. Other witnesses were concerned about a reduction in the number of 
international students coming to the UK. The Universities of East Anglia, 
Aberdeen and Leicester suggested that EU students would be more likely 
to go to other Erasmus programme countries which offered English-based 
teaching, where they could access Erasmus funding, and where the cost 
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of living was lower than in the UK.166 The East of England European 
Partnership said this would risk “a set-back to the international dimension 
of UK campuses”.167
126. The University of Oxford thought Erasmus offered “unparalleled flexibility 
of opportunity”, without which students and staff would “suffer a serious 
… diminution of their academic experience”. They were also concerned by 
the prospect of having to set up individual arrangements with institutions 
in Europe to replace Erasmus partnership agreements, which they said 
would entail “significant administrative and financial burdens” and “fail 
to guarantee the financial support” provided by Erasmus.168 The Russell 
Group suggested universities were hesitant to take unilateral action to try to 
mitigate the impact of Brexit without clarity on the UK’s future relationship 
with Erasmus.169
127. The Royal Society of Edinburgh highlighted that Scottish participants 
comprised 12% of the total UK figure—and Scotland received 13% of 
total Erasmus+ funding in the UK—between 2014 and 2018, compared to 
Scotland’s 8.2% share of the UK population. They pointed to a report by 
the Scottish Parliament’s Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Relations 
Committee, which recommended the Scottish Government should explore 
the feasibility of Scotland’s continued participation as a 2021–2027 Erasmus 
programme country in the event the UK Government was “unwilling or 
unable” to negotiate this for the whole of the UK.170
128. The University of Chester concluded:
“Ultimately, non-participation in Erasmus will harm the UK economy 
as our students will not possess the linguistic skills, self-reliance or 
breadth of knowledge and experience of students who have participated 
in Erasmus.”171
Implications for research
129. MillionPlus believed there would be barriers to both UK-EU research 
collaboration and access to research funding if the UK was “locked out of 
Horizon programmes altogether” as a consequence of Brexit.172
130. Imperial College London said it was vital to retain access to the EU’s 
“excellence-based funding instruments, such as the ERC”, and believed there 
was no UK funding instrument that could replicate and therefore substitute 
for the ERC.173 Prof Thompson, however, said that UKRI would work with 
national academies to “devise and develop a very prestigious alternative 
to the ERC and [MSCA]” if the UK lost access to these programmes. He 
confirmed UKRI was “actively involved now” in exploring this possibility 
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with national academies, but did not want to “downplay the size or scale of 
the operational challenge” involved. Prof Thompson noted the UK research 
community had a track record of establishing new funding instruments 
“at very high speed”, but was clear that full association was “the absolutely 
desired outcome” and “the future health, prosperity and success of the UK 
research and science base [was] significantly leveraged on that”.174
Alternative UK programmes
Educational exchanges
131. While continued participation in EU programmes was their clear preference, 
witnesses agreed that an alternative UK mobility scheme would be essential if 
the Government chose not to pursue full association with Erasmus, or if this 
proved unattainable.175 To establish such a programme, Jane Racz thought 
the Government would first need to decide which countries it wanted to 
work with, what sectors would be involved, who the target audience was, and 
what it wanted to achieve through the programme.176
132. Universities UK said:
“[Any new UK mobility programme] should be flexible on: mobility 
options, mobility type, destination countries, and reflect the different 
contexts of all UK nations, avoiding heavy levels of administration and 
reporting. Funding levels should be commensurate with the trajectory 
of growth in outward student mobility in recent years and reflect the 
growing funding the UK would have received from the Erasmus+ 
programme.”
Universities UK also thought the programme should reflect Erasmus’ 
systems—to facilitate cooperation and exchanges with Europe—and 
“provide incentives for other countries/stakeholders to collaborate and join”.177
133. While the University of Oxford and Cardiff University emphasised the 
importance of facilitating continued collaboration with EU Erasmus partners 
through any UK replacement programme, Herefordshire Council thought 
the Government should “invest in supporting mobility further afield than 
Europe” through “travel grants, fellowships and workshops, as well as new 
bi-and multi-lateral funding arrangements with other national funders”.178 
Joan-Anton Carbonell said student mobility opportunities should be also 
be “promoted to increase the numbers, to reach the level of other countries 
where mobility is much more established”.179
134. HEURO sought a guarantee that any replacement programme would 
be “immediately in place” as soon as the UK left Erasmus. They called 
for financial support to cover reduced tuition fees and contributions to 
institutions for students going abroad for a full academic year, as under the 
Erasmus programme.180
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Disadvantages
135. While acknowledging a new mobility scheme would be necessary in the 
absence of access to Erasmus, witnesses identified various disadvantages of 
a replacement UK programme. The University of East Anglia, for example, 
noted Erasmus+ had “extremely strong branding”, a “globally trusted 
reputation”, and “high levels of employer recognition”. They warned: “There 
is no guarantee that important universities across Europe would all recognise 
a UK alternative mobility scheme.”181
136. Liz Simpson thought there would be a risk that partnerships arranged under 
any replacement programme would have “more emphasis on reciprocity” 
in terms of the number of incoming and outgoing students. Erasmus did 
not focus on this, so “the balance [of student exchanges] may be in our 
favour with one partner, yet in the partner’s favour with another institution”. 
There was, she said, “an unwritten rule based on mutual benefit that this is 
acceptable within [Erasmus]”.182
137. The University of Edinburgh believed that the benefits of Erasmus+ “would 
be difficult to replicate and deliver through a UK-led domestic initiative”.183 
The Russell Group agreed, telling us it was “difficult to imagine” how the UK 
could replicate the benefits of Erasmus, and noting the programme had “a 
common framework with centralised rules and funding agreements”, which 
reduced the administrative burden of negotiating partnership agreements 
with overseas partners.184 Gail Armistead also agreed, noting it was “a far 
more time-consuming process and resource-heavy endeavour” to establish 
partnerships with institutions in non-Erasmus countries.185
138. Jane Racz qualified this by pointing out that universities were well-resourced, 
and many had existing bilateral relationships with partner institutions 
abroad. On the other hand, smaller projects—including those working with 
more disadvantaged groups—were often managed by “somebody trying to 
run a project in an evening or in their spare time between lessons”, who she 
thought would struggle to find exchange partners without the support of 
Erasmus.186
139. London Higher questioned the capacity of the UK to establish an alternative 
mobility scheme as quickly as Switzerland had done in 2014:
“Opportunities for exchange here were facilitated by a range of bilateral 
agreements set up quickly, using money already ring-fenced, benefiting 
from a large degree of political consensus and informed by decades of 
Swiss experience and precedent negotiating these bilateral mobility 
agreements with EU countries. The UK does not have this precedent, 
so this mirrored system would be slower to set up and most likely less 
effective in maintaining exchange numbers”.187
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General need for additional investment in educational mobility
140. Several witnesses argued that the UK should invest more funding in mobility, 
or establish new mobility schemes, regardless of whether it continued to 
participate in Erasmus after Brexit. The University of Edinburgh thought 
the Government should “deliver an ambitious funded national strategy 
to increase and support learning abroad”, highlighting the example of 
Germany’s Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) which operated alongside 
Erasmus. They explained that the German government provided funding for 
over 100,000 students to go abroad each year as well as additional funding 
for disadvantaged students.188
141. Universities UK drew our attention to its Outward Student Mobility 
Working Group, established to “explore options for government investment 
in a large-scale mobility scheme supported by appropriate infrastructure 
and administration”. This group recommended that the Government should 
establish such a scheme to facilitate further growth in student mobility. 
Universities UK suggested that this could complement Erasmus by funding 
mobility opportunities outside Europe, or provide the basis of a replacement 
programme if the UK was excluded from Erasmus+ and its successor 
programme.189
142. Cardiff University called for “dedicated support” such as bursaries and 
scholarships to help UK institutions attract EU students. They warned 
there could be a “market shock” from a sharp decline in the number of EU 
students coming to the UK if they lost access to student loans and had to 
pay the much higher ‘international student’ rate of tuition fees after Brexit.190
Research
143. The Royal Academy of Engineering told us:
“If the UK was unable to secure continued access to EU research and 
innovation programmes, it would be essential for the UK government to 
create suitable replacement research and innovation programmes using 
national funds.”191
144. Dr Thompson believed that the UK would need to “carry over” the key 
features of EU funding for any domestic programme to be “really effective”. 
For example, “an ERC-like scheme”, where applications would “not have to 
be a UK national or already based in the UK to apply for it”.192
145. Vivienne Stern noted that European research funding was “spread slightly 
more widely” across different subjects and institutions, compared to UK 
research funding.193 MillionPlus agreed and said the UK should “move away 
from ever greater [funding] concentration” in any national replacement 
scheme.194
146. Herefordshire Council called on the Government to “forge new global research 
and skills networks and co-fund more ambitious programmes to support 
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collaboration with international partners”.195 The University of Edinburgh, 
in contrast, believed it would be a “mistake to regard new international 
research collaborations” as a substitute for the EU framework programmes, 
“in terms of partnering, quality of output and ease of management”.196
Disadvantages
147. The Wellcome Trust highlighted the “major cost and logistical challenges” 
involved in setting up UK bilateral schemes as an alternative to EU 
collaborative research programmes.197
148. The University of Oxford told us that the EU programmes provided a “tried 
and tested mechanism for international collaboration”. They believed the 
impact of EU programmes would be “difficult to replicate at the national 
level” and that isolating the UK’s research efforts would be “counter-
productive in terms of economic growth and technological progress”.198
149. Cardiff University underlined how the “stability” provided by the EU’s 
seven-year research programmes had facilitated long-term planning; this 
feature was “not replicated by any other international funding programme 
or bilateral funding agreements”.199 The Russell Group agreed there 
were non-financial benefits to the EU programmes which could not be 
emulated, namely, the facilitation of “frictionless cross-border, multi-lateral 
partnerships … access to infrastructures and equipment… [and] mobility of 
the most talented researchers across Europe”.200
150. Professor Patrick Roche, an astronomer at the University of Oxford, doubted 
a UK scheme would be able to achieve “the breadth of applicants or the 
reputation” of the ERC, and noted ERC grants were “the most sought-after 
research funding opportunities for bright and ambitious scientists”. He 
added:
“Strong and productive research collaborations take time to establish 
and nurture. They are built on mutual interest, complementary expertise 
and trust which cannot be forced or dictated … Many collaborations run 
for decades, building up over time and gaining in ambition and scope, 
and they cannot just be stopped and reconfigured with new groups 
in response to a possible UK departure from our existing European 
networks. If this happens, there will be deep and lasting damage which 
could take years to repair.”201
Cross-cutting issues
151. Regardless of whether the UK leaves the EU with or without a deal—
and whether or not the UK secures association to the next Erasmus and 
Horizon programmes—witnesses were concerned about potential changes to 
immigration policy in relation to students and researchers, and the negative 
impact of ongoing uncertainty around Brexit.
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197  Written evidence from the Wellcome Trust (ESE0025)
198  Written evidence from the University of Oxford (ESE0017)
199  Written evidence from Cardiff University (ESE0011)
200  Written evidence from the Russell Group (ESE0047)
201  Written evidence from Professor Patrick Roche (ESE0019)
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Immigration policy
152. Dr Thompson told us:
“Free movement has served research incredibly well because we know 
that research thrives on the movement of people and their ideas across 
borders.”202
153. London Higher believed it would be “crucial” to “support the frictionless 
exchange of researchers and their innovative ideas” if the UK wanted 
to increase research collaboration outside the EU. The University of 
Cambridge called for an immigration system that was “sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate short term visits by researchers as well as researchers coming 
to work and live in the UK”.203
154. Amatey Doku believed that the Government’s policy of ending free movement 
would result in “more stringent immigration controls” after Brexit. Mr 
Doku acknowledged it was unclear what this might mean for students, but 
was “deeply uncomfortable” with any changes purporting to ensure students 
did not use the Erasmus programme to “come in, drop out, and stay in the 
country”.204
155. Herefordshire Council thought the UK’s post-Brexit immigration policy 
should encourage “all suitably qualified international students to study 
in the UK” and enhance “post-study work opportunities”.205 The NUS 
believed students should be granted “special immigration status, without the 
need to pay for a visa or meet additional eligibility requirements”.206 Cardiff 
University suggested:
“Lessons could be drawn from countries such as Canada and Australia 
which have created strategies and underpinning immigration policies to 
encourage international students to study at their universities.”207
156. Vivienne Stern was concerned about the impact applying the current Tier 4 
(general student) visa to EU students would have on the UK’s “attractiveness 
as a study destination”. While the success rate for acquiring a Tier 4 visa 
was high, the application process was difficult and “managed to create 
an impression that we do not really want international students”.208 Dr 
Thompson thought the UK visa system had a similar effect on researchers, 
as it was “hugely costly compared to other countries” (see Box 5). She 
suggested the UK could use Brexit as an opportunity to “go back to the 
drawing board and think about how we welcome talent” and “reduce the 
bureaucracy, the burden and the cost” of the immigration system.209
157. The implications of applying the UK’s ‘Points Based System’ for work-related 
visas to EU nationals after Brexit were considered in detail in the European 
Union Committee’s 2017 report on Brexit: UK-EU movement of people.210
202  Q 6 (Dr Thompson)
203  Written evidence from the University of Cambridge (ESE0044)
204  Q 14 (Amatey Doku)
205  Written evidence from Herefordshire Council (ESE0006)
206  Written evidence from the National Union of Students (ESE0041)
207  Written evidence from Cardiff University (ESE0011)
208  Q 8 (Vivienne Stern)
209  Q 8 (Dr Thompson)
210  European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-EU movement of people (14th Report, Session 2016–17, HL 
Paper 121) pp 38–51
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Box 5: Written evidence from the Wellcome Trust comparing UK and 
French visa costs for researchers
“[In the UK a] five-year visa for a researcher with a partner and three children 
currently costs over £11,000, and this is expected to increase once the NHS 
surcharge doubles. In comparison, fees for the same researcher and family 
obtaining a four-year French Talent Passport costs approximately £1,040 
(€1,168).*
“This data is based on a report by the Together Science Can campaign, with 
data compiled by the law firm Fragomen. Wellcome understands that there 
are no healthcare surcharges or visa fees comparable to the NHS Surcharge 
and therefore this is a direct comparison. Employees who work in France are 
entitled to French state healthcare insurance, which is automatically deducted 
from their salaries as a social contribution—and if you are below a certain salary 
threshold, you do not pay contributions to access healthcare.
“*The NHS surcharge is currently £200 per person per year, but this is expected 
to double to £400 … The £11,000 calculation assumes the researcher is exempt 
from the immigration skills charge (PhD-level occupations are exempt), 
otherwise it could cost up to £16,000.”
Source: Supplementary written evidence from the Wellcome Trust (ESE0048)
Uncertainty
158. Whether the UK leaves the EU with or without a deal, witnesses stressed 
that time was running out to confirm and establish future UK arrangements 
for educational mobility and research.
159. Jane Racz reported that the National Agency had seen an increase in 
questions about Brexit to their help desk and at events. She could not say 
whether there had been any “cooling of the application numbers” in the 
latest funding round, but confirmed that interest in Erasmus+ remained at a 
“consistently strong level”.211 Madeleine Rose noted there would be students 
coming into universities now wanting to do a placement in their third year. 
Consequently, she expected universities to “lead the charge in wanting to 
know fairly soon what the direction will be”.212
160. Gail Armistead noted that in late 2018 the higher education sector had 
already “missed one of our aspirational milestones” for knowing the form of 
future mobility arrangements. She emphasised: “We are dealing here with 
real people … students currently abroad, students preparing to go abroad, 
and projects we want to apply for funding for.”213
161. John Latham underlined the importance of long lead-in times to “introduce 
the idea” of mobility to the young people he worked with, and “sell it to 
them”. Mr Lathan noted it was “crucial to get everything right” when 
sending young people abroad, and it was normal “to take over a year to plan 
an exchange”:
“Anything less than [a year] and you will be putting something at risk 
and the quality assurance aspect of the projects will be affected. It is not 
quality assurance in the everyday sense; it is the quality of people’s lives. 
211  Q 28 (Jane Racz)
212  Q 29 (Madeleine Rose)
213  Q 17 (Gail Armistead)
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Young people have to be nurtured and really looked after when they are 
sent on exchanges or go on project exchanges abroad.”214
162. Cardiff University thought that “matters would need to be resolved … by 
mid-2019 at the latest” to avoid a “cliff-edge or gap” between Erasmus+ 
and its successor programme.215 Amatey Doku, however, saw disruption to 
mobility opportunities as unavoidable, even if the UK secured full association 
to the next Erasmus programme.216
163. The East of England European Partnership highlighted that uncertainty also 
had a “real impact” on research, particularly on large collaborative projects, 
which they said took a long time to plan and deliver.217 Vivienne Stern believed 
it was possible that the UK would still be negotiating association to Horizon 
Europe when the programme began, pointing out this had happened to 
Switzerland “on a couple of occasions”.218
The Government’s position
164. The Minister, Chris Skidmore MP, confirmed: “We are still keen to be able 
to pursue associated membership of future [EU] programmes that begin in 
2021.”219
165. Sarah Redwood, of DfE, also said that “we have made no secret of the fact 
that we want the option to explore association in the future”. If the EU was 
willing, Ms Redwood thought that negotiations on association to Horizon 
Europe could be concluded in a year, based on the previous experiences of 
countries like Switzerland, Israel and Canada.220
166. The Minister could not confirm the potential costs of future UK association 
to Horizon Europe and Erasmus while the 2021–2027 MFF was under 
negotiation, but noted both programmes were expected to have significantly 
larger budgets than Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+. Sarah Redwood explained 
that the financial contributions from associated countries to Horizon 2020 
were calculated based on a proportion of GDP, and therefore expected the 
UK would pay “a larger contribution under Horizon Europe as part of a 
larger programme”. Shahid Omer anticipated the same would be true for the 
2021–2027 Erasmus programme, which was expected to “double in size”.221
167. Nonetheless, the Minister thought that the value of participation in both 
programmes should not be measured just in terms of financial contributions. 
On Erasmus, he said:
“You simply cannot equate monetary spend with putting together 
a programme that will replicate Erasmus and 30 years’ worth of ties 
not only across member states but across institutions. It is obviously 
214  QQ 15–17 (John Latham)
215  Written evidence from Cardiff University (ESE0011)
216  Q 17 (Amatey Doku)
217  Written evidence from the East of England European Partnership (ESE0030)
218  Q 9 (Vivienne Stern)
219  Q 38 (Chris Skidmore MP)
220  Q 41 (Sarah Redwood). Negotiations on association to Horizon 2020 for countries, such as Switzerland 
and Israel, that had participated in the previous EU Framework Programme for research lasted between 
six months to just over a year. For Ukraine, the talks to secure association to Horizon 2020 lasted 
approximately two years. Supplementary written evidence from Chris Skidmore MP (ESE0050)
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important to reflect on that value. There is return on investment. There 
is also the alternative cost of replicating a similar scheme.”222
168. The Minister argued it was right and responsible for the Government to 
explore a possible domestic alternative to Erasmus, if continued participation 
and future association could not be achieved, but recognised that the UK 
would “never be able properly to supplement the historic ties and relationships 
that have been built up over 30 years”.223 Alongside “continued close 
cooperation” with European partners, the Minister noted the Government’s 
ambition, as part of its Global Britain agenda, to “work more closely and 
strengthen links” with other partners, building on existing bilateral exchange 
and mobility initiatives the UK has with countries outside the EU.224
169. With regard to Horizon 2020, the Minister emphasised the benefits of 
research to the UK economy, arguing that placing research and development 
“at the heart of [the Government’s] vision” would be “vital for [the UK’s] 
success in the 2020s”.225 He reiterated that the UK was a world leader in 
research, with existing collaborative partnerships around the world, and 
confirmed the Government would publish a new International Research and 
Innovation Strategy “as soon as possible”. The Government had also made a 
“bold commitment” to spend 2.4% of GDP on R&D by 2027, and established 
a new £110 million fund to support international research collaboration.226
170. On immigration, the Minister told us the recent Immigration White 
Paper (see Box 6) had “set out very clearly” that the UK would “focus on 
ensuring … the easiest possible route” for international students to access 
UK universities, and that there would be “no cap on international student 
numbers”. He added:
“It is not just students. I am determined to ensure that we do not lose 
momentum in developing our research and development commitment 
to 2.4%. It is not just about the money … If you do not have the research 
capability, if research staff, research teams and their families are not able 
to come here, that is something that is allied with student numbers.”227
171. The Minister pointed to the Government’s ‘EU Settlement Scheme’, 
intended for EU nationals already lawfully resident in the UK. This would 
enable EU nationals already “studying or working here by the end of March 
2019 to remain in the UK”, which he hoped would “provide certainty”.228 
He further noted that “conditions for entry and stay for purposes such as 
research, study, training and youth exchanges” would be considered during 
negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship, as set out in the Political 
Declaration.229
222  Q 42 (Chris Skidmore MP)
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224  Supplementary written evidence from Chris Skidmore MP (ESE0050). This submission outlines a 
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Box 6: The Immigration White Paper
In December 2018 the Government published a White Paper on The UK’s 
future skills-based immigration system. With regard to students, scientists and 
researchers, the White Paper sets out plans to:
• introduce a new UK Research and Innovation-led scheme to support 
the temporary movement of scientists and researchers under the 
Government’s Authorised Exchange Scheme, for those looking to 
come to the UK for two years;
• double the number of Tier 1 Exceptional Talent visas, including for 
top global scientists, to 2,000 a year;
• change the UK Immigration Rules to waive the Resident Labour 
Market Test for employers recruiting supernumerary researchers 
supported by Awards and Fellowships, and members of established 
research teams who are sponsored by UK Higher Education 
Institutions and the Research Councils under the main skilled work 
route;
• provide an exemption from the usual rules for absences from the UK 
for scientists and researchers called to assist with humanitarian and 
environmental crises;
• offer six months’ post-study leave to stay in the UK to find work after 
graduating to all master’s students, and bachelor’s students studying 
at an institution with degree-awarding powers;
• enable faster switching between the existing Tier 4 student route and 
highly skilled Tier 2 visas to support those at the early stages of their 
careers; and,
• ensure EU citizens can study in the UK without needing to go through 
the full student visa process, if the UK continues to participate in 
Erasmus or a similar programme.
Source: Home Office, The UK’s future skills-based immigration system (December 2018): https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/the-uks-future-skills-based-immigration-system [accessed 11 January 2019]
Conclusions
172. The UK is a respected and important partner in both the Erasmus 
and Horizon programmes. It is a popular destination for mobility 
placements and a world leader in research with an exceptionally strong 
science base. The UK receives substantial amounts of funding from 
EU programmes, and other less tangible benefits built on decades 
of international cooperation with European partners. We strongly 
believe—and it was the unanimous view of our witnesses—that it is in 
the UK and the EU’s mutual interest to preserve current close levels 
of cooperation on research and innovation and educational mobility. 
We are encouraged by positive indications in the Political Declaration 
on the future UK-EU relationship that this will be possible.
Educational exchanges
173. The Erasmus programme has played a significant role in facilitating 
the international mobility of people studying and working in the fields 
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of education, training, youth, and sport in the UK. The programme 
offers unparalleled financial support and flexibility to enable people 
from lower income backgrounds, and those with medical needs or 
disabilities, to take part in educational exchanges. The Government 
should seek to ensure the UK remains part of this important initiative 
by seeking full association to the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme.
174. The cost of participating in the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme is 
likely to be higher than for Erasmus+, as it will have double the overall 
budget. Nevertheless, we consider this a worthwhile investment to 
maintain access to Erasmus and the partnerships the UK has built 
within Europe through the programme over the past 30 years. It is 
clear, as the Minister himself noted, that the value of Erasmus cannot 
be measured simply in terms of financial contributions and receipts.
175. As an associated third country the UK would be able to attend 
Erasmus programme committees but would lose its voting rights, 
reducing the UK’s strategic influence over the programme. We 
are reassured, however, that these meetings operate mainly on a 
collaborative basis and non-EU programme countries are regarded 
as “valued partners”.
176. As a non-associated third country, the UK would not even have a seat 
at the table in Erasmus programme committees, and UK participants 
would have access to less funding and fewer exchange opportunities. 
We do not consider this to be an attractive option.
177. If association to Erasmus cannot be negotiated, it will be essential 
to establish an alternative UK mobility scheme. This programme 
must be adequately resourced to support continued growth in the 
number of people undertaking educational exchanges, particularly 
in the vocational education and training sector. It should also provide 
additional support for people from disadvantaged backgrounds and 
those with disabilities or additional needs, and flexibility in the 
placements on offer, to ensure opportunities to study, work, teach, or 
train abroad remain accessible to all. Even with comparative financial 
investment, however, it will be impossible to replicate aspects of 
Erasmus which are key to facilitating international exchanges, 
namely, the programme’s strong brand, trusted reputation, common 
rulebook and framework for partnership agreements, and its 
established network of potential partners.
178. Launching a new UK mobility scheme—or increasing investment 
in existing schemes—to extend mobility opportunities beyond 
Europe would be welcome in addition to continued participation in 
Erasmus. Nonetheless, this must not be prioritised at the expense 
of exchanges “on our doorstep”, which are particularly attractive to 
vocational students, people with special needs, and those with family 
commitments.
Research
179. We note the Government’s commitment to increase spending 
on research and development to 2.4% of GDP by 2027, and look 
forward to an ambitious new International Research and Innovation 
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Strategy which affirms the centrality of research and innovation to 
technological progress and the future economic prosperity of the UK.
180. A key part of this strategy should be to prioritise continued access 
to EU research framework programmes by securing association to 
Horizon Europe. The Government should ensure UK universities 
retain full access to EU funding opportunities and can participate in, 
and lead, collaborative research projects.
181. We note that the UK’s access to Horizon Europe will be commensurate 
with the financial contribution it is willing to make to the programme. 
Given the anticipated increase in the budget for Horizon Europe, this 
is likely to be larger than the UK’s contribution to Horizon 2020. The 
financial rebalancing mechanism set out in the draft Horizon Europe 
Regulation would also prevent the UK from being a net beneficiary 
of EU research funding, as is currently the case. Nonetheless, an 
increased programme budget means that Horizon Europe will be 
able to support more grants and collaborative research projects than 
its predecessor. We urge the Government to agree an appropriate 
level of financial contributions to ensure the UK can access these 
opportunities.
182. As an associated third country, the UK would have observer status in 
Horizon Europe programme committees but no vote and so would not 
have the same influence over the strategic direction of the programme 
as an EU Member State. Even so, given the strength of the UK’s 
science base and the significant role played by scientists in shaping 
research programmes, witnesses were confident that the UK can still 
remain an influential player in European research and innovation. 
We note that it will be important for the UK to “strike the right tone” 
in this regard, by seeking to ensure appropriate accountability for 
UK funds spent via Horizon Europe rather than by exercising overt 
political influence.
183. If the UK participated in Horizon Europe on a ‘non-associated’ third 
country basis, it would lose access to key funding opportunities—
notably European Research Council grants and Marie Skłodowska-
Curie Actions—and would be left without any credible means of 
influencing the future development and funding priorities of the 
programme. While limited participation in Horizon Europe would 
still provide the UK with unique opportunities for collaboration 
which could not be replicated at the national level, it is clear that 
full association is the most desirable outcome for UK research and 
innovation.
184. Additional UK research programmes will be needed to replace EU 
funding opportunities, if the Government is not willing or able to 
secure association to Horizon Europe. These programmes should 
maintain the breadth of funding across different subject areas and 
institutions provided by EU research programmes, and support 
advanced scientific research and international collaboration. The 
Government should work with the research community to determine 
what key features of EU funding should be retained in UK replacement 
programmes, such as the excellence-based funding criteria of the 
European Research Council.
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185. We commend UKRI’s willingness to work to develop prestigious 
domestic alternatives to EU schemes, if the UK loses access to them 
after Brexit. However, we note that it would take many years to 
emulate the tried and tested mechanism for international research 
collaboration provided by the EU framework programmes, the 
established research partnerships they support, and the EU’s joint 
infrastructure capabilities.
Cross-cutting issues
186. The ongoing lack of clarity over the future availability of EU funds 
for mobility and research is causing considerable concern among 
students and researchers in the UK. Although association cannot 
be secured until negotiations on the draft 2021–2027 Horizon and 
Erasmus Regulations are complete, the Government should confirm 
its intentions regarding future UK participation in these programmes 
as soon as possible to maximise certainty and stability for potential 
participants, and enable them to plan for any changes.
187. Whether the UK continues to participate in EU programmes or 
not, it will be important to ensure the UK’s immigration policy 
facilitates the frictionless exchange of students and researchers 
across borders. We welcome the Government’s confirmation in 
its recent Immigration White Paper that the UK will continue to 
welcome talented international scientists and researchers. The 
Government should work closely with the research community to 
ensure the UK visa system accommodates this ambition. Given the 
significant positive benefits international students bring to the UK, 
we also support the Government’s decision not to impose a cap on 
international student numbers.
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Erasmus and Horizon programmes
1. Erasmus+ is the EU programme for education, training, youth and sport. 
In the UK, Erasmus+ funding has supported more than 4,700 projects 
and 128,000 participants since the programme began. While many people 
think of Erasmus+ as a university student exchange scheme, the programme 
also extends opportunities to study, work, teach or train abroad to other 
groups, including vocational students, education staff and youth workers. 
It also supports youth exchanges, international partnership projects, and 
youth policy development. Witnesses were extremely positive about the 
impact of Erasmus+, particularly in terms of improving employment 
prospects, contributing to economic growth, and increasing opportunities 
for people from disadvantaged backgrounds and those with special needs. 
(Paragraph 46)
2. Horizon 2020 is the EU’s framework programme for research and 
innovation. The UK has been both a significant contributor to and 
beneficiary from Horizon 2020, with the highest share of participants in 
signed grant agreements and the second highest share of total programme 
funding distributed. Witnesses agreed that the programme helps to raise the 
standard of research and supports excellent science in the UK, including by 
facilitating international research collaboration, providing access to large-
scale research facilities, and attracting the best staff to work on research 
projects. (Paragraph 47)
Brexit implications
3. The Withdrawal Agreement would ensure that UK participation in 
Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 could continue largely unchanged but only 
until the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework period, at the 
end of 2020. We note that uncertainty about whether this Agreement will be 
ratified is a matter of concern to current and potential UK participants in 
these programmes. (Paragraph 88)
4. The Government has guaranteed to underwrite funding for successful UK 
bids to EU programmes until the end of 2020, if the UK leaves the EU 
without a deal. However, the Government still needs to agree terms with 
the EU for UK organisations to continue to participate in Erasmus+ and 
Horizon 2020 projects as third country entities. (Paragraph 89)
5. We note the European Commission’s current unwillingness to engage in 
discussions on possible actions to protect people on Erasmus+ exchanges 
and Horizon 2020 projects in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, but urge the 
Government to continue its efforts to reach a resolution with the Commission 
to avoid disruption. We remain extremely concerned about the lack of time 
available to negotiate and confirm these ‘no deal’ contingency plans. If a 
resolution cannot be agreed, the Government should use funds set aside for 
the underwrite guarantee to establish replacement UK mobility and research 
funding schemes as quickly as possible. (Paragraph 90)
6. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, provide further information 
on how it intends the underwrite guarantee to operate in practice, including 
who will disburse the funding and what terms and conditions will apply 
to beneficiaries. We recommend that schedules for releasing payments 
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and monitoring and reporting systems should be as similar to those set 
out in the original grant agreements as possible, to provide certainty and 
minimise disruption for UK participants transitioning to the new system. 
(Paragraph 91)
7. Of particular concern to the UK’s research community is the loss of access to 
key sources of UK Horizon 2020 funding, including the European Research 
Council and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, which are not open to third 
country participation and so are not covered by the underwrite guarantee. 
We note that the Government is keenly aware of this issue and emphasise the 
importance of confirming replacements for these funding streams as soon as 
possible. (Paragraph 92)
8. We welcome indications that the UK and EU are willing to work together 
on the free flow of data and regulatory alignment with regard to clinical 
trials and chemical registration. This will be essential to facilitate continued 
international research collaboration. (Paragraph 93)
Future UK policy options
9. The UK is a respected and important partner in both the Erasmus and 
Horizon programmes. It is a popular destination for mobility placements 
and a world leader in research with an exceptionally strong science base. 
The UK receives substantial amounts of funding from EU programmes, 
and other less tangible benefits built on decades of international cooperation 
with European partners. We strongly believe—and it was the unanimous 
view of our witnesses—that it is in the UK and the EU’s mutual interest 
to preserve current close levels of cooperation on research and innovation 
and educational mobility. We are encouraged by positive indications in the 
Political Declaration on the future UK-EU relationship that this will be 
possible. (Paragraph 172)
Erasmus
10. The Erasmus programme has played a significant role in facilitating the 
international mobility of people studying and working in the fields of 
education, training, youth, and sport in the UK. The programme offers 
unparalleled financial support and flexibility to enable people from lower 
income backgrounds, and those with medical needs or disabilities, to take 
part in educational exchanges. The Government should seek to ensure the 
UK remains part of this important initiative by seeking full association to 
the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme. (Paragraph 173)
11. The cost of participating in the 2021–2027 Erasmus programme is likely 
to be higher than for Erasmus+, as it will have double the overall budget. 
Nevertheless, we consider this a worthwhile investment to maintain access to 
Erasmus and the partnerships the UK has built within Europe through the 
programme over the past 30 years. It is clear, as the Minister himself noted, 
that the value of Erasmus cannot be measured simply in terms of financial 
contributions and receipts. (Paragraph 174)
12. As an associated third country the UK would be able to attend Erasmus 
programme committees but would lose its voting rights, reducing the UK’s 
strategic influence over the programme. We are reassured, however, that these 
meetings operate mainly on a collaborative basis and non-EU programme 
countries are regarded as “valued partners”. (Paragraph 175)
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13. As a non-associated third country, the UK would not even have a seat at the 
table in Erasmus programme committees, and UK participants would have 
access to less funding and fewer exchange opportunities. We do not consider 
this to be an attractive option. (Paragraph 176)
14. If association to Erasmus cannot be negotiated, it will be essential to 
establish an alternative UK mobility scheme. This programme must be 
adequately resourced to support continued growth in the number of people 
undertaking educational exchanges, particularly in the vocational education 
and training sector. It should also provide additional support for people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and those with disabilities or additional needs, 
and flexibility in the placements on offer, to ensure opportunities to study, 
work, teach, or train abroad remain accessible to all. Even with comparative 
financial investment, however, it will be impossible to replicate aspects 
of Erasmus which are key to facilitating international exchanges, namely, 
the programme’s strong brand, trusted reputation, common rulebook 
and framework for partnership agreements, and its established network of 
potential partners. (Paragraph 177)
15. Launching a new UK mobility scheme—or increasing investment in existing 
schemes—to extend mobility opportunities beyond Europe would be 
welcome in addition to continued participation in Erasmus. Nonetheless, 
this must not be prioritised at the expense of exchanges “on our doorstep”, 
which are particularly attractive to vocational students, people with special 
needs, and those with family commitments. (Paragraph 178)
Horizon
16. We note the Government’s commitment to increase spending on research 
and development to 2.4% of GDP by 2027, and look forward to an ambitious 
new International Research and Innovation Strategy which affirms the 
centrality of research and innovation to technological progress and the future 
economic prosperity of the UK. (Paragraph 179)
17. A key part of this strategy should be to prioritise continued access to EU 
research framework programmes by securing association to Horizon 
Europe. The Government should ensure UK universities retain full access 
to EU funding opportunities and can participate in, and lead, collaborative 
research projects. (Paragraph 180)
18. We note that the UK’s access to Horizon Europe will be commensurate with 
the financial contribution it is willing to make to the programme. Given the 
anticipated increase in the budget for Horizon Europe, this is likely to be 
larger than the UK’s contribution to Horizon 2020. The financial rebalancing 
mechanism set out in the draft Horizon Europe Regulation would also 
prevent the UK from being a net beneficiary of EU research funding, as 
is currently the case. Nonetheless, an increased programme budget means 
that Horizon Europe will be able to support more grants and collaborative 
research projects than its predecessor. We urge the Government to agree 
an appropriate level of financial contributions to ensure the UK can access 
these opportunities. (Paragraph 181)
19. As an associated third country, the UK would have observer status in 
Horizon Europe programme committees but no vote and so would not have 
the same influence over the strategic direction of the programme as an EU 
Member State. Even so, given the strength of the UK’s science base and 
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the significant role played by scientists in shaping research programmes, 
witnesses were confident that the UK can still remain an influential player 
in European research and innovation. We note that it will be important 
for the UK to “strike the right tone” in this regard, by seeking to ensure 
appropriate accountability for UK funds spent via Horizon Europe rather 
than by exercising overt political influence. (Paragraph 182)
20. If the UK participated in Horizon Europe on a ‘non-associated’ third country 
basis, it would lose access to key funding opportunities—notably European 
Research Council grants and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions—and would 
be left without any credible means of influencing the future development 
and funding priorities of the programme. While limited participation in 
Horizon Europe would still provide the UK with unique opportunities for 
collaboration which could not be replicated at the national level, it is clear 
that full association is the most desirable outcome for UK research and 
innovation. (Paragraph 183)
21. Additional UK research programmes will be needed to replace EU funding 
opportunities, if the Government is not willing or able to secure association to 
Horizon Europe. These programmes should maintain the breadth of funding 
across different subject areas and institutions provided by EU research 
programmes, and support advanced scientific research and international 
collaboration. The Government should work with the research community 
to determine what key features of EU funding should be retained in UK 
replacement programmes, such as the excellence-based funding criteria of 
the European Research Council.  (Paragraph 184)
22. We commend UKRI’s willingness to work to develop prestigious domestic 
alternatives to EU schemes, if the UK loses access to them after Brexit. 
However, we note that it would take many years to emulate the tried and 
tested mechanism for international research collaboration provided by the 
EU framework programmes, the established research partnerships they 
support, and the EU’s joint infrastructure capabilities. (Paragraph 185)
Cross-cutting issues
23. The ongoing lack of clarity over the future availability of EU funds for 
mobility and research is causing considerable concern among students 
and researchers in the UK. Although association cannot be secured until 
negotiations on the draft 2021–2027 Horizon and Erasmus Regulations are 
complete, the Government should confirm its intentions regarding future 
UK participation in these programmes as soon as possible to maximise 
certainty and stability for potential participants, and enable them to plan for 
any changes. (Paragraph 186)
24. Whether the UK continues to participate in EU programmes or not, it 
will be important to ensure the UK’s immigration policy facilitates the 
frictionless exchange of students and researchers across borders. We 
welcome the Government’s confirmation in its recent Immigration White 
Paper that the UK will continue to welcome talented international scientists 
and researchers. The Government should work closely with the research 
community to ensure the UK visa system accommodates this ambition. 
Given the significant positive benefits international students bring to the 
UK, we also support the Government’s decision not to impose a cap on 
international student numbers. (Paragraph 187)
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Evidence is published online at https://www.parliament.uk/student-exchanges-
funding-universities-research/ for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 
7219 3074).
Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order of oral 
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not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence 
only.
Oral evidence in chronological order
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** National Union of Students ESE0041
Newcastle University ESE0021
** Shahid Omer, Deputy Director for International 
Higher Education and EU Exit, Department for 
Education (QQ 34–45)
Queen’s University Belfast ESE0026
** Jane Racz, Director, Erasmus+ UK National Agency 
(QQ 26–33)
** Sarah Redwood, Deputy Director for European 
Programmes, International Science and Innovation 
Directorate, Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (QQ 34–45)
Professor Patrick Roche ESE0019
** Madeleine Rose, Deputy Director, Erasmus+ UK 
National Agency (QQ 26–33)
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** Chris Skidmore MP, Minister of State for Universities, 
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ESE0050
** Vivienne Stern, Director, Universities UK 
International (QQ 1–9)
The Royal Society ESE0046
The Royal Society of Edinburgh ESE0045
** The Russell Group ESE0047
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The University of Edinburgh ESE0012
* Professor Andrew Thompson, Executive Chair of the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK Research 
and Innovation (QQ 19–25)
** Dr Beth Thompson MBE, Head of UK and EU Policy, 
Wellcome Trust (QQ 1–9)
University of Oxford ESE0017
UNA Exchange ESE0027
** Universities UK ESE0032
University and College Union ESE0029
University of Aberdeen ESE0033
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ESE0028
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APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE
The House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, chaired by Lord Jay of 
Ewelme, has launched an inquiry into the UK’s future participation in the student 
exchange programme Erasmus and Horizon 2020 funding for university research. 
The inquiry will focus on the short- and long-term impact of leaving the EU on 
the UK’s participation in both programmes. The Sub-Committee is limiting its 
focus on Horizon to the effect of Brexit on funding for university research.
This is a public call for written evidence to be submitted to the Committee. The 
deadline is Wednesday 21 November. The Committee values diversity and seeks 
to ensure this wherever possible. How to submit evidence is set out later in this 
document, but if you have any questions or require adjustments to enable you to 
respond, please contact the staff of the Committee. We look forward to hearing 
from a range of interested individuals and organisations.
Inquiry focus
Erasmus and Horizon 2020 are among several EU programmes with a focus on 
education and skills collaboration. The Government is committed to participation 
in these programmes until the end of their current phases in 2020, but upon exit 
from the EU, the UK will no longer fulfil eligibility criteria for full membership.
After the UK leaves the EU, it is unclear whether or how the UK will continue to 
participate in these programmes. The Government has indicated that it will seek 
continued association with both programmes, but the substance and cost of these 
arrangements are still unclear.
Under the terms of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement published in March 2018, the 
UK will continue to participate in Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 in 2019 and 2020 
(the transition period) as this was already committed under the EU Multiannual 
Financial Framework for 2014–2020.
Further, the Government has issued a guarantee to UK organisations that it will 
underwrite successful funding bids from EU programmes where the bids had been 
submitted before the UK’s planned departure from the EU on 29 March 2019.3 
In the event of no Brexit deal being reached, these organisations would continue 
to receive funding until the end of their projects. An extension to this guarantee 
was issued in July 2018, which underwrites funding for successful bids submitted 
until the end of 2020.
The Committee is interested in how changes to the UK’s association with the 
Erasmus and Horizon programmes might affect UK students, researchers, and 
universities. This includes in the event of no deal or, should agreement be reached, 
after the transition period.
The Committee is seeking evidence on the following questions. Submissions need 
not address all questions.
Erasmus+/Erasmus
• What form of future association with Erasmus should the Government seek 
and what, in your estimation, is it likely to get? What do you think such an 
association would cost?
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• How many UK students currently participate in the Erasmus programme, 
and how many would be expected to take part after 2020 if the UK continued 
to participate in Erasmus?
• To what extent will the Government be able to influence the future direction 
of Erasmus and how important is this?
• What degree of planning have you undertaken to establish relationships 
and partnerships with countries or institutions outside of the Erasmus 
programme in the event that the UK no longer participates in it?
• What action is, or should, the Government be taking to develop relationships 
and partnerships with countries or institutions outside the Erasmus 
programme if the UK no longer participates in it?
• During the transition period—if there is one—will new applications for 
funding by UK organisations and participants be restricted in any way?
Horizon 2020/Horizon Europe
• What form of future association with Horizon Europe should the Government 
seek for UK universities, and what is it likely to get? Would it be possible for 
the UK to negotiate a bespoke association with Horizon Europe?
• How much funding would you expect a future association between the UK 
and Horizon to bring UK universities and researchers?
• To what extent will the Government be able to influence the future direction 
of Horizon Europe? What level of influence would universities hope that the 
Government would retain?
• What degree of planning have you undertaken to establish relationships and 
partnerships with countries or universities outside of the Horizon programme 
if the UK no longer participates in it?
• What action is, or should, the Government be taking to develop relationships 
and partnerships with countries or institutions outside the Horizon 
programme if the UK no longer participates in it?
• If the UK leaves the EU without an agreement on an association with 
Horizon 2020, the eligibility of some cross-university collaborations may be 
in doubt. What effect would such a scenario have on the likelihood that 
potential collaborators choose to work with UK-based researchers?
• During the transition period—if there is one—will new applications for 
funding by UK universities or UK-based researchers be restricted in any way?
A no deal scenario
• What is the expected cost of the Government’s guarantee to underwrite 
existing EU funding grants for students and universities in the event of ‘no 
deal’? How much funding would your organisation require?
• In the event of no deal, how can the Government best ensure that the 
financing of projects currently funded by Erasmus or Horizon is delivered in 
a timely and efficient manner, to minimise disruption for participants?
• In the event of no deal, what preparations are being made for a scenario 
where participating countries or institutions are unable or unwilling to 
accommodate UK participants after 29 March 2019? What is your assessment 
of the Government’s plan to “engage with member states and key institutions 
to seek to ensure UK participants can continue with their planned activity”?
